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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND MILITARY NECESSITY:
REFLECTIONS ON THE SOCIETY APART
Donald N. Zillman*
Edward J.Imwinkelried**
I. Introduction
While American involvement in Vietnam stimulated many debates, one of
the most bitter questions was to what extent civilian constitutional standards
should apply to the military. The educated draftee, a Vietnam phenomenon,
was shocked by military practices that had never been seriously questioned. The
military was seen as a lawless arm of government conducting a dubious foreign
war at the expense of draftees' rights as American citizens. Conflicts arose
between individual members and the military structure over such matters as the
right to be free from shakedown searches, the right to wear long hair, and the
right to publish and distribute antiwar newspapers. Many of these questions
reached the courts.
Military proponents, besides questioning the patriotism of their critics,
argued that the special nature of the Armed Forces as an organization devoted
to national defense justified legal standards different from those normally applied to constitutional rights; they argued that the military is a society apart
from civilian life. Yet while the military has asserted this position in varying
forms in several cases, the courts have never carefully analyzed its validity.
II. Parker v. Levy and the Society Apart
The clash between military necessity and servicemen's individual rights was
sharply focused in the 1974 Supreme Court case of Parkerv. Levy.' Levy was a
reluctant doctor-draftee in the early years of the Vietnam war.' His assignment,
training Special Forces personnel at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, quickly
crystallized his opposition to the war and the Army. In addition to demonstrating an unmilitary attitude, Levy refused his commander's order to train Special
Forces aidmen. He further expressed himself to several enlisted men that the
Vietnam war was wrong, that he would not go to Vietnam if ordered, that black
soldiers should refuse to serve in Vietnam, and that Special Forces personnel were
liars, thieves, and killers.
Levy's actions resulted in a court-martial, in which he was charged with
disobeying the lawful order of a superior, engaging in conduct "unbecoming an
officer and gentleman," and making statements prejudicial to "good order and
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University; LL.M., University of Virginia,
1973; J.D., 1969, B.S., 1966, University of Wisconsin.
** Associate Professor of Law, Uiversity of San Diego; J.D., 1969, B.A., 1967, University of San Francisco.

1 417 U.S. 733 (1974).

2 For a review of Levy's military career, see CoNscIENcz AND CommmAN

166-73 (3. Finn

ed. 1971); P.. SHERmL, MILTARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY Music IS TO MUSIC

98-157 (1969).
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discipline in the armed forces." After a well-publicized trial involving testimony
about American war crimes in Vietnam, Levy was convicted and sentenced to
dismissal from the Army and to three years' incarceration.
A lengthy series of appeals in the military and civilian courts followed,3
culminating in a successful habeas corpus petition to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.' The circuit court held that constitutional vagueness and overbreadth doctrines invalidated the "conduct unbecoming" 5 and "conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline" 6 provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice under which Levy was convicted. The court also held that since the
evidence of these offenses was enmeshed with the disobedience of orders charge,"
the latter conviction also had to be overturned.
But in a 5-3 decision the Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated Levy's conviction.' Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist (1) accepted the military's
argument that it was a "society apart" from civilian society, (2) validated the
broader reach of military criminal statutes, (3) noted that military tradition and
judicial interpretation had narrowed the scope of Articles 133 and 134 under
which Levy was convicted, (4) found Levy's conduct clearly proscribed by these
articles, and (5) held that the articles were neither vague nor overly broad.'
In a companion case, Secretary of Navy v. Avrech,' ° decided several weeks later,
the Court relied on Parker to dismiss another vagueness challenge to Article
134.1
The majority opinion in Parkeris rooted in a perception by the Court that
the military is a unique organization. Justice Rehnquist referred to the military
as a "specialized society separate from civilian society ... [with] laws and traditions of its own,"' 2 "a specialized community governed by a separate discipline,""3 and "a society apart from civilian society." 4 The military officer
3 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 740 n.7 (1974). Cf. note 7 infra.
4 Parker v. Levy, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rez'd, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
5 Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.] art. 133, 10 U.S.C.
§ 933 (1970), provides: "Any commissioned officer, cadet or midshipman who is convicted
of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct."
6 U.C.M.J. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970), provides: "Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline
in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed, forces, crimes
and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be
taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court."

7 U.C.M.J. art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970).

8 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
9 For a detailed study of the Levy and Avrech decisions, see Imwinkelried & Zillman,
Overbreadth, The First Amendment, and the Military Community, 53 TExAs L. REv. 123
(1975).
10 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
11 Avrech, a Marine enlisted man, was charged with attempting to publish a statement
disloyal to the United States "with design to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the
troops." While on active duty in Vietnam, Avrech had prepared a typed statement opposing
American participation in the war. When he gave this statement to a fellow soldier for mimeographing, it was turned over to a superior officer. Court-martial charges followed. Avrech's
conviction was sustained on remand. Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 520 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
12 417 U.S. at 743.
13 Id. at 744, citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
14 Id.
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holds "a particular position of responsibility and command."' 5 Disciplinary
standards may "regulate aspects of the conduct of members... which in the
civilian sphere are left unregulated."'" Congress is allowed "greater flexibility
when prescribing the rules by which the [military] shall be governed' even
where first amendment rights are involved. While the first amendment protects
servicemen, the "different character of the military community and of the
military mission requires a different application of those protections."' 8 This
difference is justified by the "fundamental necessity for obedience and the
consequent necessity for imposition of discipline. ...""
Justice Rehnquist correctly noted that the Court has historically recognized
the military's uniqueness. This principle, still regularly cited in military appellate
briefs and judicial opinions, appears in the 1953 decision Orloff v. Willoughby."
While denying relief to a doctor-draftee challenging a loyalty oath provision, the
Court remarked:
[f]udges are not given the task of running the Army.... The military con-

stitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that
of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as
scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must
be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.2'

Similar sentiment was expressed the same year in Burns v. Wilson, 2 a case that
remains the Court's most authoritative examination of the review of military
courts-martial by federal courts.
Neither Orloff, Burns, nor Levy is adequate, however, to guide courts reviewing military actions. Several pre-Orloff cases show that complete judicial nonintervention has never been the rule;2" and in counseling nonintervention, Justice
Rehnquist relied upon an arguably outmoded appraisal of the military.2 4
Lower federal courts, academic commentators, and the military itself have
recognized that the military community has undergone major evolution within
the last two decades.2 5 The majority opinion should have reexamined present15 Id.
16 Id. at 749.
17

Id. at 756.

18 Id. at 758.
19 Id.
20 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
21 Id. at 93-94.
22 346 U.S. 137 (1953). See Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral
Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 COLUm. L. Rav. 40 (1961); Strassburg, Civilian
Judicial Review of Military Criminal Justice, 66 Mm.. L. Rnv. 1 (1974); Weckstein, Federal
Court Review of Court-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and
Military Responsibility, 54 Ml. L. Rav. 1 (1971).
23 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
24 Justice Rehnquist cited cases dating from 1827, 1857, 1886, 1890, 1893, and 1897 in
defending the validity of articles 133 and 134. 417 U.S. at 744-49.
25 See generally M. JANowITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (1960); C. Mosxos, THE
AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN: THE RLAzx AND FILE IN TODAY's MILITARY (1970); A. YARMOLINSKY, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SocIETY (1971);
Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND.
L.J. 539 (1974); Yarmolinsky, Civilian Control: New Perspectives for New Problems, 49
IND. L.J. 654 (1974). But see PUBLIc OPINION AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 271-79
(C. Moskos ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC OPINION].
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day military and civilian society. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist ignored several
factors highly relevant in assessing the current validity of claims that the military
is a society apart.
First, the federal judiciary has become more sensitized to violations of
individual rights and the perils of unchecked discretion. The military commander, disturbed by the courts' willingness "to run his command," can empathize with police officers,26 school administrators, 7 and prison wardens. 8
These officials, like the military, argued that special circumstances of their public
duties entitled them to impose greater restrictions on individual rights, arguments
which during the last decade were frequently rejected.
Secondly, the military has changed substantially even in the short time since
Orloff and Burns were decided in 1953. America was then only eight years
removed from total victory in history's largest global war and less than 15 years
removed from the small, peacetime, nonconscripted military that typified its
history. The "society apart" was a valid description of the small, 19th century,
regular Army fighting Indians on the frontier. The description was still largely
valid when forces stood garrison or shipboard duty in the 1930's. But by 1974
the military had become a multimillion-person employer involved in almost
every aspect of American life. Substantial criticism of the military-industrial
complex, imperialism overseas, and domestic surveillance2 9 has changed the
military's image.
Besides growing in size, the modem military shows increasing signs of "creeping civilianism."'
Officer Training Programs stress graduate civilian education, foreign affairs study, and managerial technique.2 ' Prospective enlistees are
told "the Army wants to join you." Salary scales have been made competitive
with, if not superior to, civilian analogs. 2 Community relations and community
action programs are stressed. Military public relations is big business."3 The
services share many of the problems of the civilian community-racial unrest,
drug abuse, and job apathy.
Thirdly, America endured the ordeal of the Vietnam war. American political and military assumptions of the early sixties were badly shaken 10 years
later. The war also called into question some of the assumptions underlying
military law. The length of the conflict generated ample litigation against the
military. 4 Its unpopularity generated both willing plaintiffs and capable advocates, as well as some sympathetic federal judges. The limited nature of the war
26 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27 E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969).
28 E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
29 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
30 See Sherman, supra note 25, at 542; Yarmolinsky, supra note 25.
31 See JANOWrrZ, supra note 25, at 139-40; H. Radway, Recent Trends at Amerian Service Academies, in PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 25, at 13.
32 E.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1975, at 25, col. 1. A study by the Department of Defense
indicates that military pay is running ahead of comparable civilian pay. Discounting inflation,
military pay increased 37 percent from 1968 to 1973; within this same period, the private
sector increase was only 4.9 percent.
33 See W. FULBRIGHT, THE PENTAGON PROPAGANDA MACHINE (1970).
34 See generally H. MOzR & J. SCHULZ, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY (1973).
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allowed the courts to engage in hard thinking about the military without the
fears of cataclysmic effects on the nation.
As a result, by 1974 federal courts had developed a willingness to review a
variety of military actions on both procedural and substantive grounds. Courts

demanded precision in the drafting of military regulations and regularity in
their application. 5 Courts insisted that procedural due process be applied to the
military." Finally, courts recognized that the military could not deny substantive
constitutional rights ipse dixit, solely because the military is the military."
In light of all these factors, the Supreme Court's acquiescence in Parker to
the society apart justification must be questioned. The military asserts this
justification for legal standards different from those applied to civilian society in
many areas of control over the lives of its members. While different standards
may indeed be justified, they should not be accepted on faith. In each instance,
the applicable civilian standard and the separate military standard should be
identified and the validity of the distinction assessed.
III. The Two Communities: Areas of Disagreement
A. Obedience and Attendance
Obedience to orders and attendance at one's place of duty mark fundamental distinctions between the military and civilian worlds. For the civilian
community, obedience to employer orders and job attendance are private duties
enforced by civil sanctions. The employee dissatisfied with his or her position
may quit at will. The Armed Forces, by contrast, regard military membership

as more than just employment. As expressed by a venerable Supreme Court
case, military membership is a "status" creating rights and duties unknown to
the civilian world. Attendance at assigned tasks" and disobedience of lawful
orders4" are military duties enforceable by the criminal law. Breaches of these
duties can lead to removal from the service.4 1
35 E.g., Hollingsworth v. Balcom, 441 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1971); Feliciano v. Laird,
426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970).
36 E.g., Sims v. Fox, 492 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1974); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d
201 (2d, Cir. 1972); McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
37 E.g., Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d
283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
38 In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
39 U.C.M.J. arts. 85, 86, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885-86 (1970), define the offenses of absence
without leave and desertion.
40 U.C.M.J. art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970). Similarly, Article 91 punishes disobedience
of the lawful order of a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer. Article 92
punishes failure to obey a lawful general order or regulation.
41 By long tradition and federal statute, separation from military service is achieved only
pursuant to a specified form of discharge. Five categories of discharge are available. The
most common is the honorable discharge. Dishonorable and bad conduct discharges can
be given only following conviction by courts-martial. The honorable discharge under general
conditions and the undesirable discharge may be given pursuant to administrative board
proceeding. Substantial procedural requirements protect the serviceman wishing to contest
separation from service for unfitness or unsuitability. See generally DEP'T OF THrE AubY,
MILITAR'Y ADMINITRATIVW LAW HANDBOOx, paras. 3, 18, 321-35 (1972) (Pamphlet 27-21)
[hereinafter cited as MLITARY LAW HANDBOOK]. It is widely recognized that any military
discharge other than honorable discharge may significantly stigmatize the recipient on his
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The tradition that attendance and obedience be enforced by criminal
sanctions is deeply grounded in military history. Military proponents doubtlessly
view the suggestion that military nonperformers be merely fired rather than
jailed as absurd. The tradition, they argue, stems from a combination of factors
distinguishing the soldier"2 from the civilian employee. First, the primary purpose of the military, fighting wars, is hard and dangerous." Thousands of years
of military history have not changed this basic fact. Second, the work of the
military, defending national interests or even the nation itself, is a vital national
activity. Third, despite rhetoric over the glory of the military, the great bulk
of soldiers suffering casualties are from the lower social classes, generally poorly
paid, and often lightly rewarded in prestige. 4 Fourth, the military is by nature
an emergency force. National affairs are in their most satisfactory state when
the nation is at peace-when the military is not performing its distinctive function. 5 In peacetime, problems arise in maintaining employee preparedness and
motivation. Fifth, in many cases the objective of battle or war is only dimly
perceived or even actively opposed by the combat troops. Sophisticated political,
geographic, and economic theories are lost on the soldier concerned with personal
survival.
These characteristics allegedly create a unique military occupational status
in which control must be based on more than the civilian sanction of firing unsatisfactory performers. 6 The very necessity of conscription in America's last
four wars argues that this sanction would be inadequate. Leaving open the
possibility of resignation before the start of a combat patrol or before boarding
the plane to Vietnam would be intolerable; soldiers cannot be permitted to "resign" at a critical point in a battle. The military's objective, moreover, goes
beyond merely demanding the presence and obedience of its men when they
are needed. To ensure performance at critical times, such as in combat, all
personnel must be trained and in constant readiness for peak performance. The
term used to describe the soldier's preparedness is "discipline."
As defined by former Vietnam Commander William Westmoreland,
Discipline is an attitude of respect for authority which is developed by
leadership, precept, and training. It is a state of mind which leads to a
willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the
return to civilian life. See Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and
Empirical Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. Rav. 1 (1973). One consequence of the highly formalized
military separation system has been complaints from commanders that incompetent or troublesome soldiers cannot be easily removed.
42 For ease of expression the term "soldier" is used throughout to refer to a member of
any uniformed service. Unless otherwise qualified, the term includes both male and female
military members.
43 See JANOWITZ, supra note 25, at 33-35.
44 See Mosxos, supra note 25.
45 Military sociologist Morris Janowitz has noted the dilemma: "Rationality in the
military profession means that it must, in the contemporary scene, accept the notion that a
successful officer can be one who does not fight, but contributes to deterrence and the resolution of international conflict." M. Janowitz, The Emergent Military, in PUBLIC OPINioN,
supra note 25, at 255, 258.
46 Janowitz sees that "pervasive requirements of combat" as the major difference between
the military and civilian worlds. JANOWITZ, supra note 25, at 33.
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task that is to be performed. Discipline conditions the soldier to perform

his military duty even if it requires him to act in a way
that is highly inconsistent with his basic instinct for self-preservation.47
Even the sharpest opponents of the military have rarely criticized obedience
and attendance regulations. Justice Douglas, one of the strongest military critics
ever to sit on the Court,48 has conceded broad authority to the military: "The
military by tradition and by necessity demands discipline; and those necessities
require obedience in training and in action. A command is speech brigaded
'
with action and permissible commands may not be countermanded." 49
Popular
and academic critics have also recognized the propriety of criminal sanctions to
enforce attendance and obedience regulations.5"
Despite the lack of judicial challenge, the tradition is not unassailable.
Many of the military precepts underlying the tradition are open to challenge.
First, many servicemen pursue careers little different from and no more strenuous
or dangerous than numerous civilian pursuits.51 Even in wartime, the combat
soldier is the exception rather than the rule. Second, there is a serious question
whether it is advisable to criminally punish the problem soldier. AWOL (absent without leave) studies show that certain persons do not adjust to the military lifestyle regardless of the incentive or punishment. 2 In a conscript Army, it
may be necessary to punish incorrigibles to encourage the other troops, but
that rationale substantially decreases in a volunteer force. Indeed, it may be
counterproductive to retain incorrigibles in the military; it is hard to foster any
sense of esprit or elitism if the unwilling and unable are kept in the group.
Military efforts to administratively weed out the misfits without a stigmatizing
discharge" would reflect a sounder, 4 more business-oriented approach.
Further, it is possible to identify those truly unique military duties meriting
criminal sanction. The Uniform Code of Military Justice distinguishes between
47 Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Commander's Viewpoint, 10 Am. CanM. L. Rav. 1,
5 (1971).
48 See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
49 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 754 (1974).
50

See, e.g.,

51

See JANowrrz, supra note 25, at 64-68.

CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND,

supra note 1, at 33; Note, Prior Restraints in

the Military, 73 COLUsm L. Rnv. 1089 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PriorRestraints]; Everett,
Book Review, 10 Am. Caum. L. Rnv. 163 (1971). See also Sherman, The Military Courts and
Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 325, 326-28 (1971); Wulf, Commentary: A Soldier's First Amendment Rights: The Art of Formally Granting and Practically
Suppressing, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 665, 679 (1972).
52 See F. GARDNER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT (1970) (notes that the Presidio "mutiny"
defendants were largely emotionally unstable lower-class whites but with little preservice
militancy); W. GENEROUS, SwoRDs AND SCALES (1973) (a 1958 study showed little prospect
for rehabilitation of the absentee soldier, since his conduct was "deeply rooted rejection of his
role as a soldier," id. at 120); SHERILL, supra note 2, at 225-26.
53

For a discussion of the Army's Qualitative Management Program, see MLrrARy LAW

supra note 41, para. 3-39-40. Army Reg. No. 635-200, para. 5-37 (1974), states
that failure to demonstrate promotion potential is a ground for discharge. Commanders are
instructed to take separation action before the occurrence of "board or punitive action which
would stigmatize .. . in the future." Id.
54 JANowrrz, supra note 25, at 8-10, 38-39, emphasizes the shift to managerial techniques
in securing military performance. Army Reg. No. 600-20, para. 5-7 (1971), reflects the emphasis away from a solely punitive approach to leadership: "Authority will impose its weight
by the professional competence of leaders ... rather than by the arbitrary or despotic methods
of martinets."
HANDBOOK,
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wartime and peacetime in several provisions.15 The Code's criminal provisions,
which stress failure to perform rather than failure to attend or obey, relate to
uniquely military activities. The Code punishes sleeping on sentry duty,"8 endangering the safety of a command in the presence of the enemy,57 and the
negligent hazarding of a vessel.58
The military itself has recognized that current values no longer support
total reliance on punitive methods to enforce attendance and obedience. The
initial steps toward personnel management without criminal sanction reflect a
sensible approach.59 Even in the volunteer era, there are many enlistees who are
wasting their own and the military's time. Their prompt separation through
noncriminal, nonstigmatizing means does not harm any military interest." In
short, the military appears to be taking a progressive approach, deemphasizing
criminal sanctions for absenteeism and substandard performance.
Yet any wholesale elimination of punitive sanction for absenteeism or disobedience would be equally unwise. In its mission the military is a society apart.
Throughout history, severe sanctions have been an important factor motivating
attendance and obedience; other motivating factors, such as patriotism, support
of one's comrades, and self-respect, are also present. But absent the clearest
showing that punishment is totally ineffective as a motivating force for behavior,
any change should be military-directed rather than civilian-directed. Cautious
change, initiated within the military, is the proper direction to be taken.6
B. Freedom of Expression
In marked contrast to attendance and obedience arguments put forth by
the military, its claim that the needs of the society apart permit greater restriction in the realm of free expression has generated substantial controversy. Given
the historic regard of American citizens for first amendment values, the controversy is hardly surprising. There exists a wealth of commentary examining
military first amendment cases prior to the Levy and Avrech decisions; the writers
have been uniformly critical of the military's attempts to restrict free expression.
Without tracing these earlier cases in detail, it is worthwhile to briefly review
55 U.C.M.J. art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 801(10) (1970) (jurisdiction over persons serving
with and accompanying an armed force in time of war); U.C.M.J. art. 43, 10 U.S.C. § 843
(1970) (statute of limitations in time of war); U.C.M.J. art. 85, 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1970)
(desertion in time of war punishable by death).
56 U.C.M.J. art. 113, 10 U.S.C. § 913 (1970).

57 U.C.M.J. art. 99(3), 10 U.S.C. § 899(3) (1970).
58

U.C.M.J. art. 110, 10 U.S.C. § 910 (1970).

59

See note 53 supra.

60 In general, AWOL and disobedience offenses can best be handled outside the formal
criminal process. U.C.M.J. art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970), authorizes the imposition of
limited disciplinary punishment by commanders at the company level and above. So-called
Article 15 punishments can only be imposed for an offense specified under the U.C.M.J.
However, the goal is correction; punishments are of limited severity, and the offenses are
not treated as federal convictions. Such an action may have its intended educative effects on
the basically good soldier.
61 See DeNike, The New "Problem Soldier"-Dissenters in the Ranks, 49 IND. L.J. 685
(1974); Sherman, supra note 50; Wulf, supra note 50; Prior Restraints, supra note 50; Note,
Military Discipline and Political Expression: A New Look At An Old Bugbear, 6 HAzv. Crv.
RI;GHTs-Crv. LiB. L. Rav. 525 (1971).
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the areas of dispute, analyze the competing arguments, and suggest likely postLevy-Avrech trends.
The litigated issues in free expression within the military have included
the use of military facilities for political meetings, 2 the treatment of underground
newspapers,"3 civilian access to military installations for free expression purposes,"' and soldiers' rights to express views on the war and the military where
such expression may influence other servicemen."5 The courts have identified
two primary problems. First, what limits, if any, govern a military commander's
control of his installation? Control here may apply equally to servicemen and
civilians. Second, what special limits restrict free expression by servicemen?
In both areas, the military has argued for a standard different from that
applicable to civilian expression.6" Typically, the military emphasizes the unique
needs of the society apart, such as:
(1) First amendment activity questioning military and national policies
may lead to violence and a loss of disciplinary control. 7 Servicemen trained in
physical response are often eager to relieve tensions and are frequently intolerant
of "different" viewpoints. The soldier also has more ready access to weapons
than his civilian counterpart. Therefore, constitutional decisions requiring authorities to control the angry crowd rather than the unpopular speaker are not
apt precedents for the military.6"
(2) Beyond an immediate loss of control, certain types of free expression
may subtly undermine the loyalty, discipline, and morale of servicemen. Military
regulations permitting the commander to restrict speech69 posing "a clear danger
to loyalty, discipline and morale" have been upheld by civilian courts." Civilian
law rejects prior restraints; it generally allows the statement and then punishes
any criminal conduct that results.71 The military contends that an armed force
that does not respond immediately to lawful orders is an ineffective fighting
force. Particularly in a combat situation, it may be disastrous to punish disobedience or shirking after the fact.
(3) Free expression can threaten civilian control of the military." By
62 McGaw v. Farrow, 472 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1973); Dash v. Commanding Gen., 307
F. Supp. 849 (D.S.C. 1969), .ff'd, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981
(1971).
63 E.g., Schneider v. Laird, 453 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1972); Yahr v. Resor, 431 F.2d
690 (4th Cir. 1970); Noland v. Irby, 341 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
64 United States v. Flower, 407 U.S. 197 (1972); Spock v. David, 502 F.2d 953 (3d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973); Burnett v. Tolson,
474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1971); CCCO-Western v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
65 Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
66 See Imwinkeried & ZilIman, supra note 9.
67 Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Dash v. Commanding
Gen., 307 F. Supp. 849, 857 (D.S.C. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

401 U.S. 983 (1971).
68

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592

(1969); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
69 E.g., Air Force Reg. No. 35-15 (1970); Army Reg. No. 210-10, para. 5-5b (1970);
Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1325.6, para. IIIA 1 (1969).

70 Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

71 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
72 United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 175, 37 C.M.R. 429, 439 (1967).
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long tradition, significant military decisions are made by civilian political leaders,
not military personnel. Any expression of disagreement by servicemen might
move the military into politics, or prompt a military coup.
(4) Free expression by American servicemen overseas might harm foreign
relations."3 The presence of foreign troops in a country inevitably grates on local
sensitivities. When the troops inject themselves into the domestic politics, the
local citizens' displeasure can turn into outrage.
1. Civilians' Access to Military Installations
Although military limitations on free expression have been strongly criticized, they have won the general approval of civilian courts. The most significant
curtailment of military powers, however, has come in cases involving civilian
access to military installations for first amendment purposes.
The seminal installation-access case was United States v. Flower.74 There,
the Supreme Court suggested that where all or part of a military installation has
been opened to the public, civilians could not be prosecuted for the exercise of
first amendment rights on the installation. The initial Flower per curiam
opinion 5 was limited to one public avenue within Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Other decisions indicated that installations might remain closed.7" All courts
agreed that proper time, place, and manner regulations could be imposed."
Nonetheless, Flower's impact was not as limited as the military hoped. Subsequent cases expanded the "open post" concept. Such major bases as Fort
Bragg 8 and Fort Dix"9 were found to be partly open.
0
The most significant open-post decision since Flower is Spock v. David."
Dr. Benjamin Spock requested access to Fort Dix, New Jersey, to campaign
for the Presidency in 1972. After substantial procedural sparring,8 ' the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held Spock was entitled to campaign on the
post. The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari.8 2
The Court's eventual decision in Spock will hopefully resolve two issues:
(1) What are the guidelines regarding first amendment activity on a military installation?
(2) What special rules, if any, govern election campaigns on the installation?
73 Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1339 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting); Culver v. Secretary of Air Force, 389 F. Supp. 331 (D.D.C. 1975).
74 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
75 The Flower case was decided without the benefit of oral argument.
76 United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Floyd,
477 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1973).
77 Spock v.David, 502 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1974) (opinion should not be construed as
limiting Army's authority "to restrict access by non-military personnel generally to any part
of the reservation, or to issue bar notices," id. at 958); United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d
785 (10th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing between entry on public and nonpublic portions of the
military installation).
78 Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973).
79 Spock v. David, 502 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1974).

80 Id.
81

469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972).

82

421 U.S. 908 (1975).

Spock litigation.

A group of leafleteers were also plaintiffs in the
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While the Levy and Avrech opinions may encourage the military to seek
a complete overruling of Flower, the needs of the society apart do not justify an
overruling. Given military willingness to open the installation to the American
Legion, the Little League, and Armed Forces Day visitors, free expression should
be granted to others as well. " Setting aside a limited area around the post
exchange or commissary can hardly disrupt the military function. The benefits
of such an approach can be substantial: servicemen can be kept informed on
vital issues, and the exchange of ideas between civilian and military citizens will
prevent an isolation of the military from the rest of American society."4
While Flower should survive Levy and Avrech, the wisdom of the Spock
decision is questionable. The fear of military involvement in politics runs long
and deep. While Spock's campaign was more symbolic protest than serious
candidacy, the precedent is unsettling. The spectacle of either Lyndon Johnson
in 1964 or Richard Nixon in 1972 speaking to largely friendly and possibly
captive audiences at military installations exemplifies the real possibilities for
abuse.8 5 Certainly it will be the brave installation commander who provides
anything less than red carpet treatment when the Commander in Chief comes
electioneering. By contrast, a request from the challenging candidate for the
same treatment may result in unpleasantness. A commander, conscious of the
Nixon administration's "enemy list," would have struggled mightily to discourage
George McGovern from an on-base appearance. Similarly, on a local level,
favors might be given a promilitary member of the House Armed Services Committee, only to be withheld from his opponent.
While commentators have properly derided military arguments"6 about
loss of civilian control in other first amendment contexts, the argument in this
context is meritorious. Modem political campaigns are highly organized, wellcoordinated activities. Although an isolated group of leafleteers may ask nothing
more than to be let onto an agreed area of the installation and then be left
alone, an appearance by a major candidate will probably involve the installation
commander in the scheduling, security, traffic control, and media coverage for
the event. Inevitably high military officials will be injecting themselves into
political campaigns. The gains in bringing the candidate directly to the soldiervoters seem insignificant. Appearances in neighboring cities, press, radio, and
television coverage, and direct mailings can provide information for the voters.
The candidates have so many alternative means of reaching the voters that there
is no need to run the risk of embroiling the military in politics.
While line-drawing is always a problem (e.g., a request to distribute antibusing literature during a George Wallace Presidential campaign), the Supreme
83 See generally United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973).
84 Janowitz has noted the "great danger" of military isolation from civilian society. M.
Janowitz, The Emergent Military, in PUBLIC OPiNIoN, supra note 25, at 260.

85 A notable illustration is Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88 (D.R.I. 1972). There
the Navy denied access to a third party, antiwar candidate, arguing the necessity of keeping
the military out of politics. In the middle of the litigation it was revealed that then Vice
President Spiro Agnew had received an on-base welcome pursuant to a political speaking
tour in Rhode Island.
86 See Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the
Uniform Code of Military justice, 81 HAv. L. Rav. 1697 (1968); Sherman, supra note 50,
at 344.
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Court could reaffirm and clarify Flower as generally safeguarding first amendment rights with the exception of barring election activities on a military post.
The recent affirmation of the Hatch Act by the Court in Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers7 demonstrates that political activity can be curtailed for
compelling reasons. The combination of Letter Carriersand the military tradition of political neutrality could well provide the basis for reversal of Spock.
2. Restrictions in Servicemen's Free Speech
The needs of the society apart have been most controversial when the military has invoked its uniqueness as the stated justification for restricting servicemen's free expression. One author views the military as formally granting but
practically suppressing free expression by servicemen."8 The Supreme Court in
Levy 9 and the United States Court of Military Appeals in United States v.
Priest9" have recognized the application of the first amendment to the military.".
In both cases, however, free expression was restricted. Other significant militaryexpression cases follow a similar pattern,92 sanctioning unique restrictions on
servicemen's speech.
The military's proclamation that it recognizes servicemen's first amendment
rights is more than just rhetoric. Military regulations define the types of permissible and impermissible first amendment activities; some partisan political
activities are permitted, but are regulated by military regulations paralleling
the Hatch Act.9" Other first amendment activity can be curtailed only for spedfied reasons: occurrence on duty-time, occurrence in a foreign country, or creation of a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, and morale.9" In Levy, Justice Rehnquist adopted the Court of Military Appeals' "dear and present danger"9 test,
preventing commanders from capriciously curtailing servicemen's first amendment rights. Yet the Levy opinion left no doubt that the danger of undermining
discipline allows more severe restraints on military than civilian speech.9"
Levy was influential in determining the outcome of Carlson v. Schlesinger.97
Airman Carlson and his coplaintiffs were arrested for gathering signatures on
American airbases in Vietnam for a petition to Congress to end the Vietnam
war.98 Air Force regulations required prior approval of petitioning activity by
87 413 U.S. 548 (1973). See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
88 See Wulf, supra note 50.
89 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
90 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972).
91 See generally Imwinkelried & Zillman, supra note 9.
92 See Sherman, supra note 50; Wulf, supra note 50.
93 Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1344, 10, Incl. 1 (1969).
94 E.g., Army Reg. No. 600-20, para. 5-16 (1974); Army Reg. No. 210-10, para. 5-5b
(1970).
95 417 U.S. at 758-59.
96 Imwinkelried & Zillman, supra note 9.
97 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. 'Cir. 1975).
98 The body of the petition read- "We, the undersigned American Servicemen on duty in
Vietnam, wish to express our opposition to further United States military involvement by air,
sea, or land forces in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia or other countries in South East Asia. We
petition the United States Congress to take whatever action necessary to assure an immediate
cessation of all hostilities in South East Asia; to set a near date for final and complete military
withdrawal; to insure a rapid and peaceful return of American Prisoners of War; and to
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the installation commander. When such permission was sought, it was denied.
The Air Force based its denial on the theory that the petition presented a clear
danger to the loyalty, discipline, and morale of the other servicemen on the
bases.
The district court, relying on the circuit court's decision in Avrech, invalidated the Air Force regulation for vagueness and infringement of the statutory
and constitutional right to petition.99 On appeal, with the Supreme Court
Levy-Avrech precedents to guide it, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed, over Judge Bazelon's dissent.'
The Carlson opinions stressed differing aspects of the familiar "society
apart" argument. The district court emphasized the statutory right of servicemen to petition Congress' 0 ' and the "restrained" nature of the petition. The
court downplayed the fact that the incident occurred in a combat zone, and
discounted any disruption in United States-South Vietnamese relations. The
majority of the court of appeals, however, repeatedly mentioned that combat
activity had occurred around the air bases. The majority further observed that
other servicemen had objected to the petitioning activity. Most significantly,
the majority stated that the post commander's decision would stand unless "manifestly unrelated" to legitimate military needs. 2
Levy, Avrech, and Carlson have seemingly dashed the hope that civilian
courts would expansively interpret servicemen's first amendment right to free
expression. Levy sustained imprecise regulatory language against vagueness and
overbreadth challenges. 0 3 Levy and the Court of Military Appeals' opinion in
Priest indicated that almost any incitement to desertion or disobedience can be
punished. Avrech and Carlson allow the proscription of even moderate statements in a foreign setting or combat zone, and the Carlson standard puts wide
discretion in the hands of military commanders.
Unsatisfactory as it may seem to many, civilian courts have committed primary authority for the balancing of first amendment expression values to the
military. Unfortunately, many commanders may abuse that authority and continue to overreact to servicemen's expression of unpopular views.
Specific restrictions are most appropriate overseas. 4 It is there that legitimate foreign policy concerns may authorize broad time, place, or manner restrictions. 0 ' The serviceman protesting policies of his own government may incidentally be challenging those of the host country as well. Foreign citizens unfamiliar
with American traditions may resent the protest or confuse the individual serviceman's views with those of the United States.
assume and assert its responsibility for determination of future American Foreign Policy."
Id. at 1329 n.1.
99 Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C. 1973).
100 Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Committee for GI
Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

101 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1970).
102 511 F.2d at 1333.
103 The Carlson majority "entertained significant doubts" about the overbreadth of the
Air Force regulations involved. However, they believed plaintiffs were ineligible to raise the
overbreadth issue. Id. at 1333-34.
104 See Imwinkelried & Zillman, supra note 9.
105 See Culver v. Secretary of Air Force, 389 F. Supp. 331 (D.D.C. 1975).
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Presence in a foreign land, however, should not terminate a serviceman's
right of expression. Many issues of pressing concern to American servicemenracial discrimination, abusive command practices, inadequate facilities-may be
wholly irrelevant to the host government and its citizens. The serviceman's.
statements about these issues should be treated as if they are occurring in the
United States. Where matters of foreign relations are plausibly at issue, the
military should then have broad discretion to regulate the expression.
The free expression cases arising within the United States often reflect
overreaction by a military fearful of criticism. The vital interests of the society
apart were rarely at stake in decisions to prohibit newspaper distribution and
prosecute servicemen for intemperate antiwar remarks. Assuredly, civilian control was not at stake; the protesters were largely draftees or draft-induced volunteers, obviously expressing their own views. In only a few cases was there any
suggestion of imminent violence. The alleged harm was merely a remote threat
to discipline; such threats should be held insufficient to override first amendment
values.
In retrospect, the Vietnam free expression cases reflect the frustrations produced on all sides by an unpopular war. Hopefully, the American military will
never again be forced to fight a limited war of 10 years' duration with a reluctant
ally for purposes only remotely related to American interests. In the main,
American military performance in Vietnam was satisfactory; and dissent by
American servicemen was certainly an inconsequential factor in the outcome of
the Vietnam war.
If there is a lesson from Vietnam for military attorneys and commanders,
it would be that mindless censorship often is the policy most disruptive of military
discipline and morale. Civilian court decisions, which entrust the future of servicemen's free speech rights to the military, present an opportunity for the military to display a new sensitivity toward first amendment rights.
C. Religious Beliefs
The armed forces generally have conformed to civilian legal standards concerning freedom of religion and, for that reason, have rarely resorted to society
apart justifications in the area of first amendment religious freedoms. The military's growing willingness, stimulated by federal court decisions, to recognize
sincere conscientious objection as grounds for discharge is an important accommodation of military needs to religious beliefs.'
The Army has also adopted
the equally sensible practice of enlisting members of the Sikh religion without
requiring them to conform to uniform and grooming regulations that violate
their religious beliefs.'
However, two military practices, compulsory chapel
attendance at the military academies and the chaplaincy service, have inspired
or threatened to inspire litigation.
106 See Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (1974); cf. Zillman, In-Service Conscientious
Objection: Courts, Boards and the Basis in Fact, 10 SAN DiEo L. Ruv. 108 (1972).
107 Army Reg. No. 600-20, para. 5-40-47 (1974).
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The Founding Fathers' twin fears of an overstrong military and an established religion bore fruit in the 1973 case of Anderson v. Laird.118 At issue was
the validity of the first practice, the service academies' compulsory chapel attendance requirement. The district court accepted the military's distinction between
"attendance" and "worship," and endorsed the overall secular purpose of training military leaders in "the force religion has on the lives of men."'0 9 A majority
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found the violation of "the core
values of Establishment Clause" too blatant for even the society apart. The
majority found other, nonviolative ways of achieving the educational objective,
noted substantial evidence that the military's motivation was in fact religious,
and heeded the pleas of military chaplains that the compulsory requirement
generated "resentment, hostility and cynicism toward religion.""'
Reading the evidence differently, dissenting Judge MacKinnon found the
first amendment and the constitutional articles recognizing the military to be
equally important. Outweighing the minimal first amendment violations was
the "necessity of observing religious practices by future military leaders.""'
Judge MacKinnon's findings to the contrary, the compulsory chapel argument is one of the military's weakest applications of the society apart theory.
The services seem concerned with teaching a narrow form of religious orthodoxy
rather than broadening students' appreciation of the varieties of religious experience." 2 Moreover, the chaplains' testimony as to the counterproductive nature
of compulsory chapel. 3 attendance suggests the ineffectiveness of the practice.
The second practice is the statutory authorization for the chaplain's service." 4 The military has justified this arguable intrusion of the establishment
clause by reliance on society apart arguments. Without a Chaplain's Corps, it is
contended, many servicemen in combat, overseas, and occasionally in the United
States would be unable to worship.' 5 Arguably, therefore, military service could
result in a denial of the free exercise of religion.
The military's argument overlooks the fact that the great majority of military personnel are within range of civilian religious establishments. Nevertheless,
tradition and the limited intrusion on religious freedom would probably protect
the chaplaincy from constitutional challenge. Particularly on point is Walz v.
Tax Commissioner,"' wherein the Supreme Court noted that religious tax
exemptions had not created any of the dangers feared by the drafters of the
constitutional religious clauses.
A realistic look at the chaplaincy's role in the military would persuade a
court to reach a result similar to Walz. In the vast defense budget, the "religious"
108
109
110
111

466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (D.D.C. 1970).
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Id. at 307. Judge MacKinnon compared trying to teach an appreciation of the influences of religion with teaching swimming without water. Id. at 315.
112 The regulations were structured to discourage a sampling of other faiths. Id. at 296.

113 For a thorough pre-Anderson study of the military-religious-legal issues involved, see
Foreman, Religion, Conscience, and Military Discipline, 52 MIL. L. Rzv. 77 (1971).
114 10 U.S.C. §§ 3073, 5404(b), 8067(h) (1970).
115

See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972)

Foreman, supra note 113.
116 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

(Leventhal, J., concurring);
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expenditure is minute. There is no evidence that a military tour of duty has
become a forced indoctrination in a state religion. Further, the military command could properly contend that chaplains often serve a valuable nonreligious.
counselling function.
The military has properly accommodated itself to individual religious beliefs in numerous respects. The ill-considered service academy chapel requirement was the major departure from civilian attitudes towards religion. Thus
the court correctly rejected the specious argument that the requirement satisfied
a unique educational need of the society apart.
D. Fraternization
The military, by the nature of the officer-enlisted man distinction, has discouraged off-duty contact between superiors and subordinates. Officers and
their spouses generally mix only among themselves."' Enlisted personnel do the
same, with an additional distinction drawn between career NCO's (noncommissioned officers) and initial-term enlistees.
This unwritten caste system has been largely self-enforcing. In these situations, the military is similar to any large bureaucracy where clerical workers,
junior executives, and senior vice presidents live in different social worlds. In
rare cases, however, the military uses the criminal process to punish excessive
fraternization, usually under either Article 133 or 134. The civilian world's
analogous social taboos are not buttressed by criminal sanctions. Indeed, the
military sanctions have a similarity to now-invalidated racial separation statutes;... this similarity reflects the uniqueness of the military practice.
The majority of reported military fraternization cases have involved a
superior borrowing money from a subordinate." 9 Both officer-EM (enlisted
member).. and NCO-EM' 2 ' cases are found. United States v. Light, 22 a 1965
Army case, rejected any per se violation in a borrowing situation. As Light
pointed out, no provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, no specification in the Manual for Courts Martial, or no administrative regulation prohibits the borrowing of money. The closest model specification involves gambling with a subordinate by an NCO.'
Light emphasized the prosecution's re117 "In our Army, it is strong tradition that an officer does not gamble, nor borrow money,
nor drink intoxicants, nor participate in ordinary social association with enlisted men on an
individual basis." R. REYNois, TH OFFicER'S GuIDn 18 (1970).
118 See, e.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
119 United States v. Mayne, 39 C.M.R. 628 (1967); United States v. Light, 36 C.M.R.
579 (1965); United States v. Calderon, 24 U.M.R. 338 (1957); United States v. Wetzell,
12 C.M.R. 269 (1953), petition for review denied, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 842, 14 C.M.R. 229 (1954);
United States v. Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323, azff'd, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 433, 9 C.M.R. 63 (1952);
United States v. St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (1952).
120 United States v. Wetzell, 12 C.M.R. 269 (1953), petition for review denied, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 842, 14 C.M.R. 229 (1954); United States v. Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323, aff'd,
2 U.S.C.M.A. 433, 9 C.M.R. 63 (1952); United States v. St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (1952).
121 United States v. Mayne, 39 O.M.R. 628 (1967); United States v. Light, 36 (.M.R.
579 (1965); United States v. Villeados, 32 C.M.R. 561 (1962); United States v. Calderon,
24 C.M.R. 338 (1957).
122 36 C.M.R. 579, 580 (1865).
123 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (1969) (App. 6, No. 153).
See also id., paras. 124, 138 (dishonorable failure to pay debt).
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sponsibility to "establish the surrounding circumstances that show that the borrowing has a direct and palpably prejudicial impact on good order and military
discipline."' 24 Relevant circumstances include the amount of money involved,
the specifics of the command relationship, and the evidence of any attempt at
coercion.
Pre-Light cases had focused on both the detriment to the commander 2 5--lessened respect from his men, problems of awareness of financial difficulty,
difficulty in exercising command relationship over a creditor-and the dangers
of oppressing the subordinate, 2 ' which include fear of consequences of refusal
to loan money. Typically, the former aspect received greater stress in judicial
opinions.
A more recent fraternization case was United States v. Lovejoy. 2 ' Lovejoy,
a Navy lieutenant, established a homosexual relationship with a seaman on his
ship. In addition to sodomy charges,"' a separate fraternization specification
was brought. The intermediate Court of Military Review sustained courtmartial jurisdiction against a challenge that the offense was not service connected, 2 ' and approved the trial court's instruction that "[n]ot every association
between officers and enlisted persons is prejudicial. There are recognized social
and military relations between officers and enlisted persons which are legitimate
and proper.""'
Looking to "all the surrounding circumstances," the reviewing
court found sufficient evidence to sustain a fraternization conviction. The court
noted that Lovejoy had command responsibilities over the seaman, and stressed
the fact that the homosexual relationship was apparently common knowledge
to the rest of the crew.
On appeal, the Court of Military Appeals dismissed the fraternization
charge because it merged with the more serious sodomy offense.'31 The court,
however, affirmed without significant difficulty the lower court's finding that
the offense had sufficient service connection despite its off-post location.
The most interesting aspect of Lovejoy was Judge Darden's concurring
opinion. He commented on the increasing numbers of enlisted men with educations, social standing, and intellectual capacity equal to that of officers.' 32
While recognizing that fraternization "may have a pernicious influence" on
military discipline, Judge Darden felt the matter was one for administrative
rather than judicial correction.

124 United States v. Mayne, 39 C.M.R. 628 (1967); United States v. Villeados, 32 C.M.R.
561 (1962); United States v. Calderon, 24 C.M.R. 338 (1957); United States v. Wetzell,
12 C.M.R. 269 (1953), petition for review denied, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 842, 14 C.M.R. 229 (1954);
United States v. Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323, aff'd, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 433, 9 C.M.R. 63 (1952);
United States v. St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (1952).
125 United States v. Mayne, 39 C.M.R. 628 (1967); United States v. Villeados, 32 C.M.R.
561 (1962); United States v. Calderon, 24 C.M.R. 338 (1957).
126 36 C.M.R. 579, 584 (1965).
127 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970).
128 U.C.M.J. art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1970).
129 United States v. Lovejoy, 41 C.M.R. 777 (1969). The court-martial jurisdictional
requirement of "service-connection" is discussed at notes 140-143 & accompanying text infra.
130 Id. at 781.
131 United States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970).
132 20 U.S.C.M.A. at 21, 42 C.M.R. at 213.
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The Court of Military Appeals again sustained the military use of the
fraternization specification in United States v. Pitasi."' While noting the extensive military custom that helped define the specification, the court did encourage
the services to provide "some guidelines" to explain the offense to the "large
number of citizen soldiers." In Pitasi's case, however, the Court found his offense
clearly within the prohibition of fraternization despite the fact Pitasi was found
not guilty of charges of sodomy with the enlisted man involved in both offenses.
A recent civilian court challenge to the fraternization charge was rejected
in Staton v. Froehlke."4 An Army warrant officer was charged with drinking
with enlisted personnel and bathing a female enlisted member. On collateral
attack of his Article 134 conviction, Staton claimed the fraternization specification was both vague and violative of his right of association. The district court
rejected both contentions. It found that Lovejoy and other military cases had
defined the fraternization offense sufficiently to avoid vagueness problems. The
court brushed aside the associational freedom argument by a citation to Levy
and the cryptic comment that a "valid and necessary purpose" was served by
the criminal punishment of fraternization.
On balance, the military's attitude towards fraternization seems unnecessary.
Two issues are involved. First, should the armed services continue their policy
of strictly discouraging officer-enlisted social contact?; second, should criminal
sanctions be used to enforce the prohibition?
Little evidence suggests that the present social caste system enhances military performance. Other armed forces operate with looser control and no notable
loss of effectiveness. 3 ' Combat conditions typically reduce the barriers between
enlisted men and junior officers. 6 The effective combat officer is one who relies
on a degree of personal rapport with his men rather than a rigid application of
the Officer's Guide's suggested distance between gentlemen and enlisted personnel. Further, the attitude of complete aloofness subtly contradicts the military
contention that it is recruiting a higher quality of enlisted soldier. While the
Ph.D.-draftee of the Vietnam era may be a thing of the past, many current
enlistees share the social, intellectual, and cultural values of their officers. Discouraging normal social contacts arising from these mutual interests infringes
on the freedom of both parties.
Even if the military determines to retain its attitude towards fraternization,
the retention of criminal sanctions is indefensible. The limited number of
reported cases over the last quarter century clearly indicates either the rarity of
the offense or a widespread practice of ignoring its commission. Quite often, as
in Lovejoy, specific substantive provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice are ample to punish the violator.3
Where an abuse of the superior133 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 44 C.M.R. 31 (1971).
134 390 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1975).
135 See generally Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398
(1973).
136 R. RiVxiN, GI RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE: THE DRAFTEE'S GuIDE TO MILITARY
LIFE AND LAW 336-38 (1970).

137

Serious abuses involving borrowing money may be handled under U.C.M.J. art. 127,

10 U.S.C. § 927 (1970) (extortion). Less significant offenses may be handled under U.C.M.J.

[Vol. 51:396]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND MILITARY NECESSITY

415

subordinate relationship appears, military prosecutors can argue for a more severe
sentence. In the far greater number of cases, administrative regulations or informal advice from higher commanders can prevent the type of conduct that
concerns the military.
Finally, military attitudes toward fraternization subject the services to overstated allegations of class elitism and deprivation of associational rights. Other
means are available for preventing the rare abuses of the superior-subordinate
relation. In practice, the military has relied on informal persuasion to achieve
its perceived needs.13 8 The service should announce that it no longer intends
to prosecute under the fraternization specification of the Uniform Code." 9
E. Control of Drug Usage
The military has made some of its most spirited assertions of the needs of
the society apart in defense of its drug control practices. Drug problems are
certainly not unique to the Armed Forces. The civilian society has instituted
criminal and rehabilitative measures to correct servicemen's drug problems, but
the military has not been content to let civilian institutions alone control its
drug problems.
1. Jurisdictional Claims
The military has asserted criminal jurisdiction over most drug offenses
involving servicemen. The starting point for analysis of the military's jurisdictional claims is the 1969 Supreme Court decision, O'Callahanv. Parker."' There
the Supreme Court limited court-martial jurisdiction over the military members
to offenses having a particular "service connection." Two years later, the Court's
clarifying decision in Relford v. Commandant... strongly indicated that any offense by a serviceman on a military installation would be considered serviceconnected. 42 To some extent, Relford facilitated easy jurisdictional distinctions.
The serviceman who robbed the post exchange could be tried by court-martial. 43
arts. 133, 134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933, 934 (1970) (dishonorable failure to pay debts). The
dishonorable failure to pay debts specifications have been criticized. See, e.g., Note, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 16979 (1971).
138 H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE M=ARY § 4-505, at 946 (1972).
139 Moyer notes that the 1946 Doolittle Board, composed of military personnel recommended ending the prohibition on officer and enlisted men social contacts. Id.
140 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
141 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
142 In Relford, Justice Blackmun identified 12 factors to be weighed in determining whether
an offense is service-connected: "1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base. 2. The
crime's commission away from the base. 3. Its commission at a place not under military
control. 4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of the
foreign country. 5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming
from the warpower. 6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties
and the crime. 7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to
the military. 8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be
prosecuted. 9. The absence of any flouting of military authority. 10. The absence of any
threat to a military post. 11. The absence of any violation of military property. 12. The
offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts." 401 U.S. at 365.
143 While concurrent jurisdiction often exists between civilian and military courts, one side
will typically waive its right to proceed. O'Callahan only limits the jurisdiction of courtsmartial. It does not guarantee a soldier freedom from civilian jurisdiction.
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The serviceman who robbed the civilian liquor store would be tried in a civilian
court.
When it came to drug offenses, however, the military was most reluctant
to cede off-post jurisdiction. Shortly after the O'Callahan decision, the United
States Court of Military Appeals'" faced the off-post drug offense issue. The
leading case is United States v. Beeker.'" The defendant serviceman there was
charged with importing, transporting, and possessing marijuana. The possession
offenses occurred both on and off the post. The court found O'Callahanpersuasive in denying military jurisdiction over the importation and transportation
charges absent evidence relating them "specially to the military." While not
further explained, the court may have had in mind the use of military privilege,
status, or equipment in commission of the offense, or evidence that the drugs
were intended for sale in the military community.
Although the court denied jurisdiction over the importation and transportation charges, it treated the use and possession charges differently. Citing the
pre-O'Callahan decision in United States v. Williams,"' Beeker noted "the
disastrous effects occasioned by the wrongful use of narcotics on the health,
morale, and fitness for duty of persons in the Armed Forces." Any drug use, on
or off post, therefore, had "special military significance" sufficient to establish
service connection. Like use, possession was a "matter of immediate and direct
concern to the military."' 47
Having found service connection in marijuana possession and use cases,
the military high court predictably extended military jurisdiction over possession
and use charges involving heroin,'48 cocaine,"' barbiturates,"50 and, by implication, LSD. 5'
Finally the military courts claimed jurisdiction over drug sales between
servicemen.'
The Court of Military Appeals in nondrug areas finds service
connection where a military member is a victim of another serviceman's crime." s
144 The United States Court of Military Appeals was created by U.C.M.J. art. 67, 10
U.S.C. § 867 (1970). Its three judges are appointed from civilian life and sit as a court of
last review in military cases. For a discussion of the history and attitudes of the court, see
Willis, The Constitution, the United States Court of Military Appeals and the Future, 57

MIL. L. Rnv. 27 (1972); Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin,
Operation and Future, 55 MIL. L. Rav. 29 (1972).

145
146
147
148

18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, 327, 24 C.M.R. 135, 137 (1957).
United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 565, 40 C.M.R. 275, 277 (1969).
United States v. Boyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 581, 40 C.M.R. 293 (1969).

149

Id.

150 United States v. Rose, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969); United States v. Castro,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969).
151 United States v. Morley, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 43 C.M.R. 19 (1970).
152 The Court of Military Appeals did insist in deciding the service connection issue on
the offense charged. Thus, in Morley, the defendant was charged with an off-post sale to
a civilian. On appeal, it was argued to the intermediate reviewing court that a sale obviously
implied possession, thereby providing a service connection for the offense. The Court of
Military Appeals reversed, stating simply that no possession offense had been charged. Similarly, in United States v. Teasley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 131, 46 C.M.R. 131 (1973), the defendant
was charged with off-post possession of narcotic paraphernalia. Despite evidence that the
defendant had been observed shooting heroin, the court found that possession of a syringe did
not have the "same kind of direct and immediate effect upon the health, morale and good
order and discipline of the possessor's armed force as possession of the drug." 22 U.S.C.M.A.
at 132, 46 C.M.R. at 132.
153 United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (1969).
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By equating the military drug purchaser with the victim of a theft or assault,
the military found service connection regardless of the sale's location.
Given the military courts' rather rigid position on jurisdiction, dissatisfied
military drug defendants sought federal civilian court relief. In an early case,
Moylan v. Laird,"" the defendant faced a Marine court-martial for the possession of 42 ounces of marijuana. Finding no service connection in the off-post
possession, the Rhode Island district court enjoined the court-martial. In dictum,
the court noted that a different result might have ensued if a use charge was
involved.' 55
After Moylan, many civilian court drug cases shifted focus from the service
connection of drug offenses to the necessity for exhaustion of military judicial
remedies. Typically, the military argued that it should be allowed to take a defendant's case through the full court-martial and military appellate process before
any civilian review was appropriate.156 Defendants countered that exhaustion
was inappropriate where the court's jurisdiction itself was being challenged or
where exhaustion was futile, since the Court of Military Appeals decisions made
the eventual military outcome patent. 5
Recently, the Supreme Court in Councilman v. Schlesinger'58 decided the
exhaustion issue decisively in favor of the military. At issue in Councilman was
the off-post sale of marijuana by an Army captain to a military informant identified to the captain as an enlisted man. The Tenth Circuit found that the
offense affected military discipline "no more than commission of any crime by
any serviceman" and it enjoined Councilman's court-martial.' 59 Although neither
side raised the exhaustion issue, the Supreme Court asked for supplemental
briefing6 . and decided the case on the exhaustion issue.'
The majority found that, as a matter of "equitable jurisdiction," federal
courts should refrain from intervention in pending courts-martial. The same
considerations discouraging intervention in state criminal prosecutions and
administrative proceedings "apply in equal measure" to court-martial interventions. While the concluding paragraph suggests some interventions might be
proper,' 62 they will probably be rare indeed. 6 Councilman therefore left the

154 305 F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969).
155 Id. at 557.
156 See Scott v. Schlesinger, 498 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1974); Dooley v. Ploger, 491 F.2d
608 (4th Cir. 1974); Sedivy v. Richardson, 485 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1973).
157 E.g., Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Reed, v. Middendorf, 383 F. Supp.
488 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Chastain v. Slay, 365 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo. 1973); Holder v. Richardson, 364 F. Supp. 1207 (D.D.C. 1973).
158 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
159 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1973).
160 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
161 Id.
162 "We have no occasion to attempt to define those circumstances, if any, in whith
equitable intervention into pending court-martial proceedings might be jusified." Id. at 761.
163 Councilman was certainly a strong case for intervention. The challenge was to the
very jurisdiction of the military court. The 'Court of Military Appeals' position appeared
clearly defined against Councilman's position. The gravity of the offense indicated Councilman
would be a long time (probably spent in confinement) exhausting the futile military, remedies.
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issue of the service connection of off-post sales unresolved, and thus a continuing
frustration to military lawyers and commanders. 6 '
The civilian court decisions prior to Councilman had generally followed
Moylan'6 5 and had cut back court-martial jurisdiction. The civilian courts have
been less inclined than the military courts to accept broad claims of compelling
military interest in drug offenses. Two Fifth Circuit cases are illustrative. In
Cole v. Laird6 6 the circuit court found it "clear" that marijuana could not be
treated as a physically addictive hard drug. 6 7 The facts of the case-defendant
arrested while on leave with a small quantity of marijuana--simply did not
support the military's fear of a disastrous effect on the soldier involved. 6 ' The
court seemed willing to go beyond Moylan regarding casual off-post, off-duty
use of marijuana not to be service-connected.
While Cole involved marijuana, the circuit court reviewed a heroin sale
and possession conviction in Peterson v. Goodwin. 69 Despite defendant's being
off-post and off-duty, service connection was found and the court-martial conviction upheld. The Court distinguished the case from Cole, and found heroin
presented a "serious threat" to good order and discipline. The language suggested that possession, use, or sale of any "hard drug" would be service-connected.
The most likely area for further service connection conflict involves soft drug
sales among soldiers. Looking to Relford, military courts have asserted the
presence of a military victim (the buyer) in their efforts to retain court-martial
jurisdiction over the soldier-seller. Several civilian courts have rejected the
"victim" approach. 7 The classification of the purchaser as a victim is certainly
implausible when the "victim" is a military criminal investigator. The court in
Schroth v. Warner 7' adopted the previous position of a lower military court
that "[t]ransfer to the agent under the circumstances has no overtones of an
attempt to undermine the health, morale, or fitness for military duty of the
transferee."' 72 In essence, while the defendant had the bad luck to sell to an
informant, he now has the good luck to be freed from court-martial jurisdiction
because his purchaser did not intend to use the drug.
A second concern in sale cases is abuse of the command relationship. The
164 An angry dissent rebutted much of the logic underlying the majority opinion. Having
found exhaustion unnecessary, the dissenters, Justices Marshall, Brennan and Douglas, agreed
with the circuit court that there was no service-connection to allow military jurisdiction.
None of the Relford factors suggesting service-connection was present. The Government's
argument that drug offenses had a special effect on military preparedness was rejected for
lack of evidence.
165 Moylan v. Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969).
166 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972).
167 In so holding, the circuit court took note of a lengthy ruling to that effect by an Army
military judge. United States v. Watson, 3 SELEC. SRV. L. RazP. 3985 (7th Cir., 4th Dis.,
Fort Bragg, Tex. 1970).
168 Id. at 832-33.
169 512 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1975).
170 Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1973); Holder v. Richardson 364 F.
Supp. 1207 (D.D:C. 1973); Schroth v. Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Hawaii 19735.
171 353 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Hawaii 1973).
172 Id. at 1044. See also United States v. Blancuzzi, 46 C.M.R. 922 (1972). A contrary
military position is expressed, in United- States v. Sexton, 48 C.M.R. 662 (1974); United
States v. Johnson, 47 C.M.R. 885 (1973).
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military may disapprove of the sale of drugs from private X to private Y. When
the seller is captain X and the purchaser is identified as private Y, the military's
concern measurably increases. Both Councilman... and the Third Circuit case
Sedivy v. Richardson,14 in which defendant was the senior NCO of a military
police company, involved these considerations.
2. Drug Abuse Programs
As observed, the military has vigorously advocated that it be allowed to
punish most military drug offenders. Of even greater significance is the military's
insistence on rooting out drug abuse in its own way. Two notable decisions, one
civilian and one military, have suggested the limits of military drug detection
activity.
The civilian courts' most thorough examination of military drug abuse
programs came in a noncriminal case. Plaintiffs in Committee for GI Rights v.
Callaway' 5 challenged the European Command's drug abuse program.'
To
suppress drug abuse, the Command, covering most of the American troop
strength in Europe, resorted to searches of soldiers and their property, admittedly
done without probable cause. These legally questionable searches were used to
identify and discipline suspected drug users. Another regulation provision prohibited the use of wall posters and other materials identified with prodrug or
antimilitary causes.'77 In federal court, the Government conceded that the program did not comport with civilian constitutional standards but defended it on
the grounds of military necessity.'
The Government offered statistics and testimony to show that a drug epidemic existed in the Command. The district court
was not persuaded. It found the level of drug abuse "not particularly different
from drug use encountered among civilians in major United States cities" and
not comparable to. the epidemic proportions of abuse in Vietnam.' 79 The court
assigned the Army the burden to "demonstrate by concrete proof an urgent
necessity to act unconstitutionally in order to preserve a significant aspect of discipline or morale."18 While the Command's program might have been approved
if it had not involved criminal sanctions or stigmatizing administrative discharges,
or if it had been limited to "particular troops in highly sensitive duty assignments," it could not be maintained in its Commandwide form. 8 '
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
173

Councilman v. Schlesinger, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).

Defendant Councilman was a Cap-

tain. The purchaser was in fact a Specialist 4, who was identified as an enlisted clerk-typist
to Councilman.
174 485 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1973).
175 370 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C.), order stayed, Civil No. 835-73 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 7, 1974).
176 The action was brought as a class action on behalf of 145,000 lower ranking enlisted
men in the European command, stationed primarily in Germany. The significance and widespread publicity given the litigation make it possibly the most serious challenge to command
authority yet litigated.
177 Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 937-39, 941 (D.D.C. 1974).
178 Id. at 940.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 940-42.
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Circuit. 8' The circuit court largely accepted the military's necessity claims and
reversed. The constitutional discussion began with a citation to Levy's holding
that the "different character" of the military community and mission could
justify otherwise unconstitutional action. Viewed "in totality," the drug inspections satisfied a reasonableness test under the fourth amendment. The court noted
(1) the "substantial threat" and "serious debilitating effect" of drugs on the
military mission, (2) the lessened "expectation of privacy" in the military community, (3) the primary health and fitness objective of the drug searches, (4)
the effectiveness of unannounced drug searches, and (5) the Army's attempts to
guard "dignity and privacy" in conducting the searches. Similarly, the imposition of possible administrative sanctions upon a confirmed drug user was constitutionally permissible despite the lack of a prior due process hearing. Military necessity compelled the result. While the various sanctions-revocation of driving privileges, removal of civilian clothing, housing in special rehabilitation facilities,
denial of pass privileges, etc.-were not "medical remedies," they were "medically related" to rehabilitating drug-dependent soldiers. The court emphasized
the Command directive that the sanctions be "carefully monitored" by the commander. Finally, constitutional vagueness challenges to the poster regulation
were quickly dismissed with citation to Secretary of Navy v. Avrech.
While the decision was a signal victory for the armed services, it should not
be broadened beyond its intent. Between the initial filing of complaint and the
circuit court's decision, the Command program had been subject to intense legal
scrutiny by its defenders. Broad language in the directive had been narrowed.
Extreme abuses had been corrected. Even so, the court in reviewing the revised
circular stressed the need for protecting "dignity and privacy" and for "careful
monitoring" of disciplinary measures. The circuit court upheld the major part
of the drug program but did so in such a way as to require close legal assessment
by the military of similar efforts.
A setback to military drug programs was administered by the Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Ruiz. 8' There an Army private refused
an order to provide a urine sample for drug testing. It was conceded that the
order's purpose "was not to obtain incriminating evidence from the accused but
to implement a command-wide rehabilitation program."' s The order was nonetheless violative of the broad self-incrimination provisions of Article 31 (a) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. The military court held that military necessity
arguments for the program were unavailing. One approach open to the military
was to honorably discharge Ruiz for failure to present evidence of his fitness for
duty.
3. Conclusion
Several comments are appropriate in assessing military claims of special
judicial consideration in drug cases. Initially the military undeniably has a
182
183
184

Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
United States v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 181, 48 C.M.R. 791 (1974).
U.S.C.M.A. at 182, 48 C.M.R. at 798.
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legitimate interest in the fitness and combat readiness of its personnel. The drugdependent soldier is no asset to the defense of the nation. The circuit court's
opinion in GI Rights properly held that drug-free Armed Forces are more
necessary than a drug-free civilian community.
On the other hand, the military has frequently resorted to obvious rhetoric
concerning drugusage. In 1957, when the Court of Military Appeals decided
Williams, popular opinion regarded any drug usage as something abnormal and
dangerous. In the years since, attitudes have markedly changed. While debate
continues over the long-term effects of marijuana, it appears highly questionable
to regard casual use as addictive or significantly debilitating. Second, the fact
that many young people of all social classes have at least experimented with
marijuana makes military efforts to completely eradicate its use subject to skepticism, if not ridicule.
In certain respects, the military has changed its own attitudes toward drug
use since the days of the Williams case. Military drug abuse programs now
stress rehabilitative rather than punitive measures."8 5 Even when the criminal
process is used, sentences have decreased in severity, the punitive discharges are
by no means automatic.'
Quite often, the military has been content to let the
civilian courts handle off-post drug cases. In truth, the contemporary commander expects a certain incidence of drug usage in his command. While he
does not like it, he probably regards it, along with occasional AWOL's and offpost brawls, as a fact of military life.
The evolving military attitude appears to be:
(1) separate the confirmed addict,
(2) try to rehabilitate the casual or experimental user, and
(3) correct the conditions of boredom, loneliness, and frustration that stimulate drug usage.
The services would suffer little by abandoning their extensive jurisdictional
claims over use and possession offenses. Where serious drug usage has incapacitated a serviceman for duty, administrative discharge procedures can
best sever his connection with the military. Similarly, where only casual use is
involved, noncriminal rehabilitative steps are fully available within the services. 8 "
An arguably more legitimate service connection appears in the off-post sale to
military personnel cases. Drug sales, unlike drug usage, have not taken on the
aspect of routine criminal activity at any large installation. Even where marijuana
is involved, the services can be justifiably concerned when servicemen are responsible for introducing drugs into the military community. The off-post user
or possessor cases suggest that the defendant has attempted to remove his criminal
185 Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 941 (D.D.C.), order
stayed, Civil No. 835-73 (D.U. Cir., Mar. 7, 1974).
186 At first, punitive discharges for drug offenses were rather frequent. Now such discharges are quite rare, and are usually imposed for only sale offenses involving large quantities.
187 In Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1974), Judge
Gesell would have allowed the military considerable latitude in nonjudicial efforts to correct
a command drug problem.
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conduct from any military connection. The sale cases show the opposite pattern.
The military population provides all or part of the seller's market. While the
"victim!' terminology is imprecise, the argument for service connection in sales
offenses is supported by cases allowing service connection over an off-post robber
where the victim is a fellow soldier. In both situations, civilian courts may be
less attuned to military interests than a court-martial proceeding. In both, the
military may need to assert control to preserve the impression that it places a high
priority on the well-being of its members. In both, the court-martial may be a
more effective means of deterring other potential offenders on the installation.
Similar consideration might sustain service connection in cases involving abuse of
rank where charges other than sale from superior to subordinate are involved.
Thus Sergeant Sedivy,"8' as drug party host to his MP subordinates, could be
subject to court-martial for use or possession.
G.I. Rights and Ruiz leave the status of military drug programs somewhat
uncertain. At a minimum, however, all courts have recognized the need for
assessing the legal issues involved. Quite possibly, G.I. Rights would have been
decided for the military a decade earlier by a per curiam reference to Orloff:
"Judges are not given the task of running the Army."'8 9 One may quarrel with
the circuit court's balancing of the issues, but at least serious consideration was
given constitutional concerns in the face of a plausible claim that the greatest of
military necessities required drastic corrective action.
F. Personal Appearance
A significant body of civilian law has sustained the rights of citizens to wear
their hair at any length they choose. 9 While some restriction has been
allowed, 9 ' the constitutional arguments of privacy and free expression have
prevailed. Courts have demanded reasonable justifications for governmental
efforts to dictate grooming standards for employees. In the military, however,
the struggle against long hair has been more passionate than in the civilian
world. Needs of the society apart have been frequently asserted to justify a
strict military standard.
At times the military's struggle against long hair has taken on aspects of the
comic. While some courts have viewed the serviceman's assertions as trivial,'92
others see them as raising significant constitutional questions.

188 Sedivy v. Richardson, 485 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1973).
189 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953).
190 E.g., Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College,
470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); Massie v. Henry, 455
F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl,
419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
191 Rinehart v. Brewer, 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974) (prison grooming standards);
Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973) (must show "legitimate state interest reasonably related to the regulation"); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 989 (1972) (high school dress code).
192 Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion); Whitis v.
United States, 368 F. Supp. 822 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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1. Hair Length
Virtually all long hair cases have involved military Reservists or National
Guardsmen involved in weekly training or summer camp. Early cases sought to
assert a right to wear long hair at Reserve activities.' 93 Typically, the Reservist
stressed the need for long hair in his civilian position, the limited time spent on
Reserve activities, and the noninterference of long hair with the performance of
duties.
An illustrative case is Raderman v. Kaine' Plaintiff-Reservist let his hair
grow long out of personal preference and because of his position as agent for
rock music groups. Until mid-1968, Army regulations allowed long hair if it contributed "to the individual's civilian livelihood." When the regulation was
rescinded, Raderman asserted constitutional grounds for his right to remain in
good standing in the Reserves without trimming his locks. The military asserted
that Raderman had more limited constitutional rights than a civilian, that
obedience to orders would be undercut by granting relief, and that the "frequent
need for expedition in call-up orders" 9 ' dictated a complying haircut.
The Second Circuit, while puzzling over some of the military's logic and
noting the peculiar military-civilian nature of the Reservist, denied relief to
Raderman. The court intimated that a gross abuse of discretion might be correctable, but concluded that none was present here."'
Raderman epitomized the lack of success of direct challenges to hair length
regulations. While courts recognized the growing body of law putting civilian
long hair on a constitutional basis, special military needs were allowed to control.
One court upheld the regulations even though it noted that plaintiff's long hair
had not affected the performance of his military duties. 9
2. Use of Wigs
In a 1970 long-hair case, the court, while holding against plaintiff, observed
that he could have met the demands of both worlds by wearing a short hair wig
at his Reserve assemblies. 99 Long-haired Reservists soon adopted the suggestion,
to the dismay of Reserve commanders. All services soon made it clear that wigs
were not permissible as a substitute for complying haircuts. An early challenge
reached the First Circuit in Friedman v. Froehlke.'99 Army National Guardsman
Friedman wore a short hair wig bringing his drill appearance in compliance with
military standards. However, the then current Army regulation allowed the
wearing of wigs only to cover baldness or disfigurement. Threatened with sanctions for wearing the wig, Friedman went to federal court. He conceded the
193 Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971); Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1970); Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969); Smith v. Resor,
406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).
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411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1106.
Gianatasio v.Whyte, 426 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 911.
470 F.2d 1351 (Ist Cir. 1972).
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military's right to set outward appearance standards for hair, but he challenged
their right to insist that only a complying haircut would be satisfactory.
The Army's response cited several justifications. Returning to the Raderman
argument, the Army considered the regulation necessary to "insure prompt activation of Reserve units."2 ' More practically, the wig might interfere with the wearing of gas masks. Finally, the Army alleged Friedman wore the wig only to
avoid another regulation and not for a "beneficial purpose." '' None of the military's arguments were persuasive to the circuit court. Reflecting on the speed
of military barbers, the court found the delay in activation argument implausible.
Testimony as to the wig's stability and the experiences of bald and disfigured
users rebutted the gas mask argument. Finally, the court was unimpressed with
"a regulation whose sole justification is that it insures that another regulation
can be obeyed in only one way."2 2 Interestingly, the court invalidated the
regulation as in excess of the statutory authority granted to the military. No
decision on constitutional grounds was rendered.
In the same year, a district court in New York, in Harrisv. Kaine,2°2 rejected
the Army's position on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Harris found
constitutional violations stemming from the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The court held the Army had admitted that Harris' wig did not interfere with his
performance or prevent him from presenting a neat and soldierly appearance.
Further, the court stressed that Harris was a civilian rather than a soldier the
great majority of the time. Turning to constitutional analysis, the court noted
the growing body of decisions recognizing freedom to wear one's hair at any
chosen length. While conceding the issue "may seem trivial to some,"'2 4 the
court held that constitutional due process was violated where no legitimate
military interest was furthered by the no-wig regulation.
After the initial litigation, the Army amended its regulation to allow the
wearing of wigs by Reservists and Guardsmen at weekly training assemblies."'
This left the field to the Air Force, 00 Navy, and Marine Corps. What followed
was one of the most widespread litigative assaults of the Vietnam war era.
While individual variations have occurred, recent wig litigation has generally
taken the following posture. Plaintiff-Reservist will concede the military's right
to set outward appearance standards.0 7 Further, he will make no argument
that the suggested standards be applied to active army members. Then he will
return to the Raderman-Friedmanarguments. After showing that the wig has in
no way interfered with performance of duties, plaintiff will claim the regulation
is invalid because it is totally unrelated to military needs. Constitutionally, the
200

Id. at 1353.

201 Id.
202 Id.
203 352 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
204 Id. at 774.
205 See ARMY REG. No. 600-20, para. 5-39d (1974).
206 The Air Force has recently rescinded its wig regulation. See Hennig v. United States,
385 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill.1974).
207 Hough v, Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920
(8th Cir. 1973); Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972); Martin v. Schlesinger,
371 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va.
1973); 'Carmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
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regulation is alleged to violate rights of privacy""8 and freedom of expression
under the first and ninth amendments, in addition to raising equal protection
difficulties under the fifth."' The equal protection argument turns on the bias
in favor of the baldheaded or disfigured,210 and occasionally on differing
standards favoring female service members.2 11 As final arguments, the plaintiff
notes the Army's abandonment of the wig policy 2 and the great disparity
between the time spent on Reserve duty and in civilian life.2"'
Military response, particularly from the Marine Corps, has increased in
sophistication since the Friedman and Harris decisions. One line of attack is to
rebut or at least downgrade any constitutional aspects involved. If hair length is
not a matter of constitutional right, the military can argue that it should be given
unchecked discretion over an internal military concern. The attack is most successful before a federal judge inclined to grant considerable discretion to the
military in running its internal affairs, and inclined as well to regard long hair
litigation as trivial. Other courts will concede constitutional dimensions to the
right to govern personal appearance but will treat the freedoms involved as of
lesser magnitude 4 than first amendment rights or constitutional rights in a
criminal prosecution.
The second military approach looks for possible hindrance in the performance of duties from wig wearing. Added to the Friedman gas mask argument 5 have been claims that wig wearers could be barred from active duty
installations where differing hair standards prevailed,210 that wigs would
interfere with combat simulated amphibious landings,2" that wigs could be
sucked off flight line attendants to the damage of jet engines, 1 ' that wigs could
be caught in machinery1 or that wigs would interfere with climbing on landing
nets."0 Generally, these arguments have been hypothetical and most courts,
regardless of eventual decision, have treated them with skepticism. 2 '
208 Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973).
209 Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975); Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d
298 (4th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973); Good v.
Mauriello, 358 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); Harris v. Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
210 Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4thCir. 1974); Good v. Mauriello, 358 F. Supp. 1140
(W.D.N.Y. 1973); Harris v. Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Communale
v. Mier, 355 F. Supp. 429 (W.D. Pa. 1973).

211 Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975); Martin v. Schlesinger, 371 F.
Supp. 637 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
212 Hipple v. Warner, 368 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
213 Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920
(8th Cir. 1973).
214 Whitis v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 822 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Hipple v. Warner, 368
F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
215 Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975); Friedman v. Froehlke, 470
F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972); Quinn v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Mass. 1975).

216 Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973).
217

Smith v. Commanding Officer, 380 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Tex. 1974).

219
220

Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
Id.

218 Hipple v. Warner, 368 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1973).

221 Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973) (military arguments regarded as "bordering on the chimerical"); Hipple v. Warner, 368 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Va. 1973); Garmon v. Warner,
358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (military contentions are "totally unproved").
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The third, and often surprisingly successful contention, is premised on the
intangibles of discipline, loyalty, and morale. The increasing unification of the
Reserves and active duty forces has allowed argument that distinctions between
Reserve and active duty members in matters of grooming should not be tolerated.222 The military accurately assumed that federal courts would be disinclined
to interfere with active duty standards. And of course a "one force" approach
would mean barbered Reservists rather than bewigged regulars. As Brigadier
General Lanagan of the Marine Corps Reserve testified, such uniformity
is essential to the inculcation of group or unit identity... embracing within
that concept such attributes as group pride and morale, interdependence and
confidence in each other, military discipline and obedience, as well as selfdiscipline and adjustment to military life, all of which are indispensable to
223
molding and maintaining an efficient combat-ready military force.
The Marines further stressed the regulation's purpose in distinguishing Marines
from everyone else."2 4 As General Lanagan testified, short hair wigs and the
concept of the "small, disciplined, elite fighting force ' 22 were incompatible.
Finally, the military occasionally invoked the Friedman argument that regulations were made to be obeyed rather than distinguished. 2
One intangible factor helping the services in all hair cases may have been
the conception of the Reservist-Guardsman as a privileged draft-dodger.2 27
Decisions sustaining military discretion often suggest a judicial gut-reaction that
getting a haircut was a small price to pay for avoiding full-time military duty and
the possibility of Vietnam service.
In the federal court hair cases, the military has lost as often as it has won.
Currently, three circuits have struck down the ban on short hair wigs.228
Possibly more significantly, the trivial nature of the litigation has reflected adversely on the armed services. The fact that the services were forced to spend
their time battling over inches of hair hardly enhanced the services' public image.
Military justifications were often embarrassingly make-weight.225
Military defenders of hair length and "no wig" regulations probably view
the issues as symbolic. In their view, Reservists demanding expanded grooming
freedoms were more interested in protesting the military and the Vietnam war
222 Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972); Whitis v. United States, 368
F. Supp. 822 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn.
1973), aff'd sub nom. Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1973).
223 Whitis v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 822, 825 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
224 Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975); Quinn v. United States, 397
F. Supp. 1250 (D. Mass. 1975); Smith v. Commanding Officer, 380 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Tex.
1974); Martin v. Schlesinger, 371 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Whitis v. United States,
368 F. Supp. 822 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D.
Minn. 1973).
225 Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1973).
226 Whitis v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 822 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Klinkhammer v.
Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1973).
227 See Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion); Communale v. Mier, 355 F. Supp. 429 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
228 Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir 1974); Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920
(8th Cir. 1973); Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972).
229 See notes 209-215 supra.
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than military appearance regulations. The cases suggest this "us" versus "them"
confrontation. 3 0
To be sure, many of the Reservist litigants had little love for the armed
services. 3 ' However, the long hair issue is more than a convenient excuse to vent
antimilitary sentiment. In defending appearance standards far more restrictive
than community norms, the services have appeared not only unreasonable but
slightly paranoid. The military's rather blind association of longer hair with
antimilitary dissent helped segregate servicemen from the vast majority of their
contemporaries of all political and social attitudes. As longer hair became
increasingly stylish among all age groups, the services' litigative posture became
less defensible. Efforts to persuade courts that the military could not survive a
Reservist hair style similar to that worn by local businessmen, Supreme Court
justices, and national political figures were understandably difficult.
In the hair cases, the military seems to have glorified society apart justifications for its own sake. The results have probably been far more harmful to
recruitment and morale than any other issue. Evidence indicates the Army's
standards are almost uniformly unpopular among today's soldiers, who are largely
true volunteers with no political axes to grind.3 2 Common sense rather than
judicial demand should persuade the services to loosen standards for both
Reservists and active duty members.
G. Sex-Related Discriminations
In recent years, the military has encountered varied forms of the sexual
revolution. The military's response has been often contradictory. Unlike other
areas studied, most assertions of the separate needs of the society apart have been
made in the context of administrative rather than criminal proceedings.
The problem has been compounded by civilian uncertainty over appropriate
equal protection standards in the area."' Courts have differed over whether
sex-based discriminations should be tested by a "rational basis," "strict rationality," or "strict scrutiny" standard.3 4 Finally, the treatment of homosexuals
may be evolving from criminal sanction to constitutional protection.3 '
1. Pregnancy Discharges
The first sex-related cases examined the status of the pregnant servicewoman.
The services had traditionally required the prompt honorable discharge of
230 Brigadier General Lanagan's testimony often suggested this distinction. See Whitis v.
United States, 368 F. Supp. 822 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F.
Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1973); Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
231 See, e.g., Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1973).
232 See Army Times, May 28, 1975, at 2, col. 1 (Representative Patricia Schroeder reported receiving over 4,000 comments from soldiers on haircut policies; over 99 percent
favored a liberalized standard).
233 A recent review of the Supreme Court's struggle with the proper constitutional standard
to apply to sex discrimination cases is found in Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme
Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 617 (1974).
234 See id.
235 E.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp.
924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual
Conduct, 72 Mcnr. L. REv. 1613 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Homosexual Conduct].
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pregnant females.2"6 Several cases challenged the applicable regulations as
denials of equal protection, violations of due process, invasions of privacy, and
infringements of religious freedom."' The most notable case was Struck v.
Secretary."" A majority of the Ninth Circuit panel held against the officer nurse's
claim that she be allowed to remain in the Air Force. The Court found a
"compelling public interest" in not having pregnant soldiers, and noted Struck's
particular unfitness for duty in a combat zone.2"9
District court cases in four other circuits split on the assertions of- special
military needs. All but one predate the Supreme Court teacher pregnancy
case, LaFleur v. Board of Education.4 In the post-LaFleur case Crawford v.
Cushman.4 the Vermont district court rejected a woman Marine's request for
reinstatement after a pregnancy discharge. Medical testimony indicated
plaintiff's ability to perform duty through at least the seventh month of
pregnancy. Nevertheless, the court was unsympathetic to the servicewoman.
While it restated the familiar "inability to perform in emergency situations"
argument, it refused to equate pregnancy with the normal illness or injury.
Unlike a cold or a broken arm, a pregnancy creates persisting physical, emotional, and practical problems. Among the problems were the lack of child
care facilities at many Marine installations and the "traumatic" effect of an
enforced separation of child from mother because of overseas assignments.
Since the initial litigation, the military has shown a willingness to temper the
moralism and absolutism inherent in the pregnancy regulations.2 42 Most notable
is the Army's June 1975 change of policy for enlisted personnel. In effect it
reverses the prior presumption of discharge of pregnant servicewomen. Under
the changed policy, pregnancy is not assumed to be a reason for discharge
except for women in training on active duty status or women pregnant prior to
entry. In other cases the servicewoman may remain on active duty without the
special permission of the Army. A liberal discharge policy for those desiring
separation for reason of pregnancy is also specified.243
This new policy is an encouraging change. Defenders of prior service policy
have overrelied on "worst case" examples; positing that one pregnant nurse will
materially disrupt a war is simply farfetched.244 So long as the statutory prohibition on female combat participation continues,245 women will probably
236 E.g., Air Force Reg. No. 36-12 (1972), cited in Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460
F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1972).
237 Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972); Flores v. Secretary of
Defense, 355 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C.
1972); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972).
238 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972).
239 Judge Duniway's dissent argued that the military had failed to show a distinction
between pregnancy and other temporary disabilities for which discharge was not mandatory.
A resolution of the issue was expected when the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 409 U.S.
1071 (1972). However, the Air Force mooted the case by allowing Stuck to remain on active
duty.
240 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
241 Crawford v. Cushman, 378 F. Supp. 717 (D. Vt. 1974).
242 See Army Reg. No. 635-200, ch. 8 (1973), regarding provision for requesting waiver of
discharge requirement. It has been noted that all Air Force officers and 410 out of 428 enlisted women were granted waivers in 1973. 2 MIL. L. REP. 1043 (1974).
243 Army Reg. No. 635-200 (1975) (Interim Change).
244 Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972).
245 E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 6015, 8549 (1970).
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compose only a small percentage of the Armed Forces serving in stabilized tour
areas. The development and popularization of contraceptive techniques will
help to keep pregnancies among first-term female recruits at an allowable level.
The changed Army policy recognizes that career women can be both soldiers and
mothers in most circumstances. As a result, efforts to secure career-oriented
husband and wife teams, particularly in the professional branches, will be
enhanced.
2. Pay, Promotions, and Other Benefits
Equally difficult sex-related cases have arisen outside the pregnancy area.
Within the last three years, Supreme Court decisions have attempted to clarify
standards governing pay, benefits, and promotions between the sexes. In
Frontierov. Richardson,246 the Supreme Court reviewed a federal statute which
limited a servicewoman's right to a spousal dependency allowance to cases where
the servicewoman shows that her husband receives more than 50 percent of his
support from her.247 A male claiming his wife's dependency does not have to
make an equivalent showing. The military's primary justification was mere
administrative convenience. Without finding sex a suspect classification, the
Supreme Court cited Reed v. Reed24 and invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds.
A more difficult evaluation of the needs of the society apart faced the
court in Schlesinger v. Ballard.49 Ballard was a male Navy officer facing involuntary honorable discharge from service for failure of promotion. 5 Only
a slightly longer period of active duty would have made Ballard eligible for
career retirement status after 20 years of service. Instead, he faced a much less
monetarily rewarding lump sum separation bonus. Ballard pointed out that a
female officer in his situation would have had a longer period in which to obtain
the necessary promotion. Seizing on this statutory discrepancy, Ballard claimed
a denial of equal protection and a right to serve out his 20 years.
The military responded that the differential promotion periods reflected
the realities of Naval service. By legislative decision, women are ineligible for
combat service"5' and are denied other, career-enhancing opportunities. Equal
competition with men was therefore a virtual impossibility. Recruitment of good
women officers for career service required the differential.
Reversing a previous three-judge court decision, 52 the Supreme Court endorsed the military's view. Underlying the Ballard decision, of course, is the constitutionality of the legislative restraints on female military duties.2"' While
246 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
247 10 US.C. §§ 1072, 1076; 37 U.S.C. §2 401, 403 (1970).
248 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
249 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
250 The military demands that officers demonstrate the ability to hold higher rank and
responsibilities. Thus, at designated times all officers must be considered for promotion to the
next higher grade. Failure to be selected on two occasions while at the same rank will end
the officer's career. See MrLrrARY LAw HANDBook, supra note 41, para. 3-20-27.
251 E.g., 10 U.S.C. H2 6015, 8549 (1970).
252 Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (three-judge panel).
253 See Beans, Sex Discriminationin the Military, 67 Mrr.. L. R.v. 19 (1975).
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significant progress has been made in integrating women into the armed
services,254 the restrictions on women in combat activities remain. Given that the
combat branches are the heart of the military, full female equality may be some
distance in the future. The Equal Rights Amendment,2 5 if enacted, would be
a powerful impetus to legal challenge of these restrictions. Realistically, while
some women have the ability and interest for combat training, they will probably
remain a numerically insignificant minority.
3. The Service Academies
For a time, it appeared that the next military sex discrimination case to
reach the Supreme Court would involve sexual integration of the service
academies. Several potential female applicants were denied the opportunity to
apply for admission and brought suit in federal court. In defense of the traditional maleness of the academies, the military has relied on the statutory proscription of women in combat: the academies are designed to train combat leaders,
women are statutorily barred from combat service, therefore women should not
be admitted to the academies. Once again, theory collides with reality.
Significant numbers of academy graduates serve in branches and perform duties
open to women. 56 In addition to providing military leadership, the academies
provide an expenses-paid college education for selected young citizens. In June
1974, the District of Columbia district court applied the rational basis test and
granted summary judgment for the military. 5 ' In November, the court of appeals overturned the summary judgment. The appellate court questioned the
district court's conclusion that the "rational basis" test was appropriate for sex
discrimination cases; it further found significant unresolved issues of fact.25
While service academy coeducation poses practical problems, much of the
military's reaction has been tradition-based. The academies are the repository of
American military tradition.5 9 The great majority of high commanders are
academy-educated. Part of the academy tradition is that they are different
from civilian educational institutions. 6 ' The absence of women has played
a part in promoting the academy image of tough, ascetic, regimented training.
The effect of female admission on traditions is unclear. That change would
occur, however, seems undeniable. The critical question is whether valid military interests would be served by retaining male-only academies. Certainly a
significant burden of proof falls on the services. A single-sex, government-funded
educational institution would probably not survive even a rational basis analysis.
The military's "combat training only" justification is factually incorrect. The
254 N.Y. Times, May 4, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
255 See Haley & Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: A Response to Critics of the Equal
Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS L. J. 199 (1971).
256 Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
257 Edwards v. Schlesinger, 377 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C., rev'd sub nom. Waldie v.
Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
258 Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Gir. 1974).
259 See JANOWITZ, supra note 25, at 57-60, 127-38.
260 The academies have in recent years become more like civilian universities. See H.
Radway, Recent Trends at American Service Academies, in PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 25, at
20-26.
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changed-traditions argument is based far more on dubious stereotype than
provable fact.
The traditionalist arguments have not impressed Congress. It has removed
the bar to female admissions to West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force
Academy; 26 the academies will receive their first female admittees in the fall
of 1976. Congress found the males-only rule to be out of step with a modem
military attempting to increase its appeal to both men and women.
A corollary issue to military academy admission is the proscription against
marriage for academy cadets. In the civilian community, the right to marry is
a fundamental one.262 Ironically, later in an officer's military career, marriage
is seen as a valuable career enhancement.2 62 But at the cadet level, marriage is
not authorized. Officially, the services claim that:
(1) married men are less capable of coping with a structured environment;
(2) the demanding academic program would place unfair demands on
family responsibilities; and
(3) the cadet attrition rate (with loss of government investment) would
increase if married cadets were admitted.26
Behind these justifications lurks an unarticulated belief that the inculcation of
military discipline and values is diminished by competing family loyalties.
These issues were raised in O'Neill v. Dent.65 There a Merchant Marine
Academy regulation barred not only married cadets but divorced ones. Pursuant
to court order, records were collected on all cadets known to have been married
while at any of the service academies. Twenty-seven cases were reported. The
court found no indication that academic or disciplinary problems increased
among the married students. The court noted married students' satisfactory
performance in civilian schools, the lack of similar regulations at foreign military
academies, and the absence of any marital prohibition on ROTC students.
Using the strict scrutiny test, the court invalidated the regulation.
4. Homosexual Servicemen
If the military's attitude toward the women's movement has been ambivalent, it has shown no indecision toward gay liberation. 6 6 The consistent
military attitude has been that homosexuality has no place in the services. A
recent Army regulation opines that the homosexual's "presence impairs the
morale and discipline of the Army, and homosexuality is a manifestation of a
severe personality defect which appreciably limits the abilities of such individuals
261 See H.R. 6674, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
262 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
263 For an examination of discrimination against bachelors in the armed services, see D.
Woodward, Marital Discrimination in the Military, Jan. 22, 1974 (unpublished thesis in Army
Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Va.).
264 O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).

265 Id.

266 See C. WrLLrAss & M. WEINBERG, HoMosnxuALs AND TEE MILITARY (1971); Note,
The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 Ann. L. REv. 687, 703-06 (1973); Comment, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORErAm L. R.v. 465 (1969).
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to function effectively in society."2 7 The regulations authorize the removal of
the homosexual from service by judicial or administrative measures."" While
some sensitivity is shown to the gradations of the offense and the serious problems
of false accusations, 6 ' the message is clear: homosexuals have no place in the
military.
The civilian courts have thus far shown no reluctance to endorse the
military's position.'
Two of the most litigated military cases, those of Navy
Rear Admiral Hooper2 7 and Commander Augenblick,272 involved homosexual
relationships with enlisted men. In each, federal courts disapproved of the misconduct involved and found service connection as required by O'Callahan.
Judge Nichols' remarks on "cases involving homosexuals that stain the pages of
our report" leave no doubt as to his attitudes regarding homosexuals."'
The military has remained firmly opposed to homosexuality at a time when
civilian homosexuals have made some progress against arbitrary discrimination.
In Norton v. Macy," 4 the District of Columbia circuit court overturned a
civil service homosexual discharge. The court noted four ways that homosexuality might concern the employer:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

as a threat to office security by encouraging employee blackmail;
as suggestive of an unstable personality unsuited for certain work;
by presenting offensive overtures disturbing the fellow workers; and
as a general embarrassment to the agency.

On the facts of the case, the court found none of the first three elements. The
fourth, general embarrassment to the agency, was insufficient to sustain a dismissal. The court required "some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection
between an employee's potentially embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of the
'
service. 275

Should Norton apply to the military? The military would doubtlessly resist it.
Their initial response would focus on the grounds cited in Norton, namely the
dangers of security breaches through blackmail, the fear of exposure of other
servicemen to homosexuality in the often confined world of barracks or ship,27 '
and the belief that homosexuality is only one indication of a personality unsuited
for military service. Certainly in the appropriate case, each may be a reason for
267 Army Reg. No. 635-89, § 2a (1960).
268 Army Reg. No. 635-200, para. 13-5a(7) (1973).
269 The converse of the problem is false admissions of homosexuality to gain an automatic
discharge. See Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1066
(1973.)
270 E.g., Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Chafee, 355 F.
Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Benson v. Holloway, 312 F. Supp. 49 (D. Neb. 1970).
271 Hooper v. Laird, 482 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Hooper, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958).
272 United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); Augenblick v. United States, 509
F.2d 1157 (Ct. C1. 1975).
273 Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1039 (1970).
274 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.Cir. 1969).
275 Id. at 1167.
276 E.g., Doe v. Chafee, 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Benson v. Holloway, 315 F.
Supp. 49 (D. Neb. 1970).
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disqualification from military service. However, to extrapolate these factors to
an absolute ban on homosexuals within the military is to rely too heavily on
stereotype. Innumerable military jobs involve no security considerations. Even
where they do, blackmail has to rely on the serviceman's fear of disclosure.
Given a willing admission of sexual preferences, the blackmail threat disappears.
Personality instability is best judged in individual cases. Quite obviously, the
military's designation of homosexuality as an undesirable personality trait may
itself contribute to instability.
Action can also be taken in individual cases where homosexual advances
bother coworkers. Assault provisions of the UCMJ are certainly adequate for aggravated cases. Lesser cases can be handled administratively. In brief, then,
the military has sufficient regulatory and disciplinary power to prevent objectionable conduct, homosexual or heterosexual.
The hard questions involve the services' concern about off-duty homosexual
acts between consenting servicemen or -women or between a consenting soldier
and a civilian. Quite clearly, the military is maintaining a rigid policy in the
face of crumbling homosexual stereotypes. The most notable indication is the
recent litigation to enjoin discharge filed by a career Air Force sergeant, who is an
admitted homosexual. 7 Based on combat experience, leadership, and performance of duties, the sergeant is an ideal airman. Based on sexual preferences, he
is ineligible for continued service. Studies indicate that the sergeant may be
only the most visible of a substantial number of military homosexuals whose
honorable service has been indistinguishable from soldiers of a more accepted
sexual orientation. 78
The Air Force case implies that the courts may soon be giving serious attention to the homosexual issue. What unique military needs might indicate a result different from Norton? Initially it should be recognized that accurate
information on homosexuality is lacking. Is homosexuality a healthy personal
preference, a disease, or a criminal act?... Doctors, social scientists, and lawyers
are divided in their opinions. The services might assert the following special
military needs for a continued complete prohibition on homosexuals:
(1) The unique physical demands of military service make it improbable
that most homosexuals can adjust. Therefore, a complete prohibition
on homosexuals is appropriate.
(2) The potential for mental and emotional stress in the service far exceeds
that in civilian life. Again, the average homosexual cannot cope.
(3) The substantial military hostility toward homosexuals would be translated into physical attacks and other abuse. Protection of the indi277 A spokesman for the Department of Defense, explaining the homosexual discharge
provisions, stated that the military "has an obligation and responsibility to provide our young
men and women . . . the most wholesome and healthful environment possible." Wash. Post,
May 28, 1975, at 1, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 16, col. 1; N.Y. Times,

Sept. 18, 1975, at 12, col. 1.

278 It is estimated that some 10 percent of the Armed Forces may be homosexual. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 16, col. 1; see WiLLAms & WEINBERG, supra note 266, at 60.
279 See generally Homosexual Conduct, supra note 235.
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vidual homosexual and prevention of discipline harming confrontations
support the wholesale ban.
(4) Military recruitment might suffer as potential recruits (and their
parents) discovered they "might have a queer in the next bunk."28
Whatever the scientific nature of homosexuality, it is probably correct
that large portions of the American public regard homosexuals with
fear or contempt. Therefore, the recruiting loss might seriously harm
prospects for a long-term volunteer force.
(5) Beyond recruiting, the military's self-image and public image would
suffer. Traditionally the military has conveyed an image of masculine
vigor and spirit. Whether a combat rifleman or a stateside supply
clerk, the services encourage pride in doing a "man's work. '' 281 Just
as certainly, the male homosexual image has been one of an effeminate
and misfit. Given the difficulties of recovery from Vietnam, the military should be spared such a disturbing psychological adjustment.
It is clear that the military's reasons, relying heavily on stereotype, are
open to challenge. Homosexuals have survived service life. Without the burden
of their homosexuality being a crime or a ground for discharge, their number
and percentage would increase. Further, the homosexual could plausibly better
survive long periods without women than the heterosexual. Physical assaults for
reasons of race, religion, or physical appearance have long been a feature of
civilian as well as military life. The appropriate corrective measure can hardly
be to exclude the victimized minority member.
The fourth and fifth assertions of special military need recall the discredited
Norton "embarrassment to the agency" standard.28 2 Here a federal court might
have significant difficulty assessing claims of special military need. If the military could offer proof that homosexual admission would harm recruiting or
public confidence in the Armed Forces, judicial caution would be warranted.
If such proof was lacking, the military would be on far weaker grounds. Much
of the military's difficulty is that it is being thrust into the forefront of judicial
homosexual reform. If homosexuality is to be constitutionally protected, the
military would prefer that the landmark cases and legislation arise in the civilian
world. The military could then merely respond to clear precedent at a time
when public opinion had largely accepted the changed position of the homosexual in American society.
IV. Conclusion
As
of what
military
fighting
280

281
282

the Vietnam era recedes, historians will begin dispassionate assessment
the decade meant to the American democracy. Certainly the American
has lessons to learn. In Vietnam, the military faced the burden of
a major war without broad popular support. Several of the issues dis-

See note 277 supra.
WILLIAMS & WEINBERG, supra note 266, at 56-57.
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[Vol. 51:396]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND MILITARY NECESSITY

435

cussed in this article stemmed from that burden. Others were encouraged by a
popular and judicial attitude that refused to view the military as a national
institution above criticism. If anything, the post-Vietnam military must be impressed with the grave dangers of isolating itself from the society of which it is
a part.
The military should be particularly aware that its base of support has
eroded. The generation of Americans that knew the total mobilization and victory of World War II is fast approaching retirement age. Increasingly, the male
voting public are draft avoiders or veterans of the Korean or Vietnamese conificts. This electorate will view claims of special privilege for the armed services
with skepticism. Skepticism will also surface in the courts when the military
argues for dispensation from normal constitutional standards.
A summary of the litigated claims of military necessity indicates the need
for a careful reexamination by the military of its objectives and methods. Too
often the services have fought senseless battles over trivial issues. The haircut
litigation, " the academy chapel case,2 4 and certain sex discrimination cases
are illustrative." 5 In the free expression area, the military has often overreacted
to minor threats, thereby alienating many servicemen and civilians.'" Justifications based on military necessity often seem manufactured after the fact to
rationalize essentially arbitrary actions.
These conclusions, distilled from the foregoing analysis, suggest that courts
should be skeptical of claims of military necessity. Easy deference to arguments
of military uniqueness is not a satisfactory judicial policy. Vietnam and Watergate warn of the dangers of unreviewed discretion in government and excessive
worship of slogans like "national security" and "executive privilege." Further,
the expansion of the military since World War II has blurred any line between
civilian and military concerns. As previously noted, the Rehnquist view of the
military in Parkeris inaccurate. In many areas, the military courts and agencies
have assimilated civilian standards. In other areas, the federal courts have
compelled the military to comply with civilian standards, and the compliance
has not significantly disrupted military functions. Continuing review of military
practices by Congress and the courts can encourage internal review by the military itself. Where legitimate military needs exist, military attorneys can argue
the specific facts that entitle the military to different constitutional treatment.
Where only outmoded tradition justifies a military policy, internal housecleaning
will be encouraged.
Finally, while all arms of government desire special deference to their
expertise and importance, the contemporary military should be particularly
hesitant to claim unnecessary privileges separating it from civilian society. The
isolation of the Vietnam years can hardly be reversed by a policy of continuing
to support arbitrary action violating constitutional rights.
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Accordingly, when considering issues involving military control over the
lives of its members, a federal court should begin its analysis assuming that the
prevailing civilian standard applies to the military. Given that assumption, the
court should assign the burdens of going forward and proof on the existence
of military necessity to the Government. Courts should be cognizant that the
burdens' measure is as important as its allocation. In the past, too many courts,
military and civilian, have accepted the Government's vague, general claims that
the military is a society apart. Federal courts should demand more precise
argumentation; they should insist that the Government articulate and substantiate the specific military interest which allegedly precludes the application
of the particular civilian legal standard in question.
Obviously, the court faces a difficult task in evaluating the Government's
factual showing to decide whether the Government has sustained its burdens.
In some cases, such as drug abuse programs, the Government's claim of military
necessity rests on its assertion that the military is experiencing an acute disciplinary problem. In such cases, the court should demand (1) a quantitive showing of the dimensions of the problem and (2) comparative military-civilian
statistics. In other cases, such as in the first amendment area, the asserted government interest is more intangible, and the court faces the Solomonian task of
assessing the weight of a government interest defying quantification. Certainly
the court should be sympathetic to government assertions of intangible military
interests during wartime, especially if the particular case arises in a combat zone.
But placing the burden on the military will help to ensure that constitutional
standards are accorded due respect.
There are doubtlessly those who will dispute the wisdom of this approach.
Military traditionalists may argue that this analytic framework would bring
disaster to the military by undermining discipline. That fear is overstated. In
the first place, the recent trend in federal civilian decisions has been markedly
favorable to the military. That trend bespeaks the federal judiciary's appreciation of military needs and its genuine reluctance to interfere in military matters except as a last resort. Secondly, as witnessed in many of the fields this
article has reviewed, on its own initiative the military has begun to civilianize
itself. Increasingly military decision-makers are questioning the assumption that
given differences between military and civilian practices are defensible. Recent
changes in policies regarding nonstigmatizing discharges for unsuitable recruits,
retention of pregnant servicewomen, and waiver of haircut regulations to recognize religious beliefs prove the military can change without the pressure of congressional or judicial mandate.
The military community has long viewed itself as the guardian of civilian
citizens' liberties. The military must now develop a broader view of its guardian
role. For better or worse, the civilian courts have chosen to grant the military
wide authority over servicemen's constitutional rights. The military must remember that, although in many respects it will always remain a society apart, the
men and women filling its ranks are members of American society and, therefore,
generally entitled to exercise the same civil liberties they have sworn to defend
with their lives.

